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The Right to a Jury Decision on Questions of Fact
Under the Seventh Amendment
PAUL F. KIRGIS*
In a series of decisions over the last decade, the Supreme Court has
reconsidered an aspect of the Seventh Amendment that has been long
overlooked: the allocation of particular questions to the judge or the jury
in a case where the right to a jury trial applies. Breaking with historical
practice, the Court has emphasized considerations other than the fact-law
distinction as a basis for identifying the questions that must go to the jury.
Most prominently, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., the Court
focused on 'functional considerations" in assigning a question of patent
claim construction to the judge. In this Article, the author critiques the
Court's recent Seventh Amendment jurisprudence, arguing that the Seventh
Amendment compels courts to assign questions of fact to the jury. The
author then proposes a test for identifying questions of fact based on the
types of inferences required to answer a particular question. Under this
test, questions requiring inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute are 'fact" questions, which must be decided by the
jury in appropriate cases. All other questions may permissibly be answered
by the judge. The author applies this test to the Court's recent decisions to
show how an inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction can help
resolve the most difficult issues of decisional responsibility.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Seventh Amendment provides that "[i]n [s]uits at common law, where
the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall
be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any
Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law. ' 2
Because of its cryptic reference to the "preservation" of an undefined right of trial
by jury, the Seventh Amendment has produced a number of persistent disputes.
These disputes involve four basic issues: (1) the features that a civil jury must
possess to satisfy the Amendment; (2) the causes of action that trigger the jury
right; (3) the questions that the jury must decide once the right is triggered; and
(4) the extent to which the Amendment proscribes changes in adjudicative
procedure.
Of these, the first, second, and fourth have received considerable judicial and
academic scrutiny, and basic parameters have emerged. For example, in regard to
the first issue, the Supreme Court has held that juries may consist of as few as six
13 SIR EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARY ON LITrLETON 460 (J. H. Thomas ed., 1818)
"Judges do not answer questions of fact; juries do not answer questions of law." Id.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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persons,3 but that those persons must be selected from a cross-section of the
community.4 On the issue of whether a cause of action triggers the jury right, the
Court has developed a widely criticized but entrenched test focusing on whether
the cause of action is more analogous to an action recognized at law at the time of
the passage of the Amendment or to an equitable or admiralty action at that time.5
On the fourth issue, the Court has generally allowed procedural innovations
empowering both trial and appellate judges to decide cases as a matter of law,6
while at the same time barring the early disposition of equitable claims by judges
where those dispositions could have preclusive effect on related legal claims to
which ajury right applies. 7
The third issue, involving the questions the jury must decide, has received
more ambiguous treatment. As a historical matter, courts in both England and the
United States have generally assumed that the jury's primary function is to decide
3 Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 160 (1973). The Court has never reached the question
of whether civil juries may consist of fewer than six persons, apparently because no federal
district court has attempted to implement such a reduction. The Court has held, however, that a
state may not convict a criminal defendant based on the unanimous vote of a jury of fewer than
six persons. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 239 (1978).
4 Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). Congress later codified the requirement
of cross-sectional representation in the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-69.
5 See, e.g., Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987) ("To determine whether a
statutory action is more similar to cases that were tried in courts of law than to suits tried in
courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine both the nature of the action and of [sic]
the remedy sought."). The Court typically asks first whether the nature of the cause of action
resembles a legal or equitable cause of action, and if that inquiry is inconclusive, the Court asks
whether the remedy sought resembles a legal or an equitable remedy. In a separate line of
cases, the Court has also held the Seventh Amendment inapplicable where Congress has
statutorily created public rights enforceable in non-Article HI tribunals. See Margaret L. Moses,
What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court's Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence,
68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183, 212-16 (2000).
6 See Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 372 (1943) (holding that a grant of a
directed verdict does not violate the Seventh Amendment); Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v.
Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 655 (1935) (holding that an appellate court may dismiss an action on
the merits where it finds evidence insufficient as a matter of law); Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v.
United States, 187 U.S. 315, 322 (1902) (holding that a grant ofjudgment for the plaintiff based
on the defendant's failure to comply with pleading requirements did not violate the Seventh
Amendment).
7 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508-09 (1959) (holding that where
both a declaratory judgment and an injunction are sought, a judge may not preemptively decide
factual issues as part of an injunction claim); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 479
(1962) (holding that where an action involves both legal and equitable claims, common factual
issues must be decided by jury); cf Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 333-37
(1979) (holding that a plaintiff's use of offensive collateral estoppel in a legal action based on
an earlier equitable action did not violate the Seventh Amendment).
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questions of fact, while judges may permissibly decide questions of law.8 The
Seventh Amendment's text and relevant statutory provisions suggest that the
amendment incorporates this basic division of responsibility, and a number of
older Supreme Court opinions seem to concur. But until recently, the Court had
seldom explored in any depth the assignment of particular questions to the judge
or the jury. That changed with four cases decided between 1987 and 1999: Tull v.
United States,9 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,10 Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc.,11 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.12
Reflecting the general consensus dismissing the fact-law distinction as
camouflage for the normative conclusion that a question should go to the judge or
to the jury,13 the Court's analyses in these cases avoided reference to the fact-law
distinction as a basis for decision. Instead, the Court invoked a variety of other
8 See COKE, supra note 1. Despite Lord Coke's rigid pronouncement that judges do not
decide questions of fact and juries do not decide questions of law, see id, until the latter half of
the nineteenth century courts did not automatically assign questions of fact to the jury and
questions of law to the judge. "Prior to 1850, the judge and jury were viewed as partners in
many jurisdictions. The jury could decide questions of both law and fact, and the judge helped
guide that decision-making process by comments on the witnesses and the evidence." JACK H.
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 496 (3d ed. 1999); see also 9A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2d § 2503, at 156
(1995). The role of the jury has been described as follows:
Some of the most famous students of the judicial process have argued that one of the
purposes of the jury system is to permit the jury to temper strict rules of law by the
demands and necessities of substantial justice and changing social conditions, thereby
adding a much needed element of flexibility.
Id.
9 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
10 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
11 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
12 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
13 See LON L. FULLER & MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 593 (6th ed.
1996). This normative determination has been explained in the following manner:
It is commonly said that questions of fact are for the jury and questions of law are for the
judge. A more realistic analysis would be that questions the legal system assigns to the jury
are called "questions of fact," and questions the legal system assigns to the judge are called
"questions of law."
Id; see also 21 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5052, at 249 (1977) ("[J]udges decide many questions of fact, just as
the jury can decide many questions of law, and therefore the law-fact dichotomy is a poor basis
for allocating functions between them."); Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, Facts in Law
and Facts of Law, 7 INT'L J. EVID. & PROOF 153, 155 (2003) (describing the fact-law distinction
as "artificial and notoriously problematic").
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criteria, such as historical antecedents, 14 common-law analogies, 15 and
"functional considerations."' 6
Unfortunately, however, the Court's resort to criteria other than the fact-law
distinction failed to produce a coherent body of law. Indeed, the cases seem to
conflict on critical points. For example, where Tull v. United States17 holds that
the judge may decide on the imposition of a civil penalty under the Clean Water
Act, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc. 18 holds that the jury must
decide on the imposition of statutory damages under the Copyright Act. 19 And
where Markman applies a "functional" test focusing on the relative competencies
of judge and jury to find that the Seventh Amendment does not require a jury
decision on the construction of a patent,20 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,
Ltd.21 applies a "functional" test focusing on the nature of the issue to be resolved
to find that the Seventh Amendment does require a jury decision on the takings
issue in an inverse condemnation case.22
These cases-especially Markman-have provoked significant scholarly
reaction.23 Most of the commentary has centered on policy-based critiques of
Markman. One of the few scholars to address the cases more generally, Professor
Margaret Moses, has attempted to make sense of the cases by relating them to one
14 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379-83 (1996) (engaging
in an extensive but inconclusive historical analysis to determine whether a jury must interpret
patent claims); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 n.9 (1987) (denying the right to a jury
decision on a civil penalty because of a lack of evidence that "the Framers meant to extend the
right to ajury to the remedy phase of a civil trial").
15 See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347-53 (1998)
(emphasizing the "legal" nature of copyright claims in determining that a jury must determine
statutory damages in a copyright action).
16 See Markman, 517 U.S. at 384, 388-90 (considering "relative interpretive skills of
judges and juries" and finding judges better suited to interpret patent claims).
17 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
18 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
19 Id.
20 Markman, 517 U.S. at 388-90.
21 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
22 Id. at 720-21.
2 3 See, e.g., John R. Lane & Christine A. Pepe, Living Before, Through, and With
Markman: Claim Construction as a Matter of Law, 1 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 59 (2001); Scott
A. Lund, Patent Infringement and the Role of Judge and Jury in Light of Markman and Hilton
Davis, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 627 (1996); David B. Pieper, The Appropriate Judicial Actor for
Patent Interpretation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Decision in Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 51 ARK. L. REv. 159 (1998).
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or more of four "strands" of Seventh Amendment jurisprudence. 24 In this Article,
I will take a different approach. I will argue that the Supreme Court has too easily
dismissed the fact-law distinction as a basis for allocating decisional
responsibility between judge and jury under the Seventh Amendment. If a
consistent basis exists to identify questions of fact, both constitutional text and
precedent suggest it should be used to identify the questions the jury must decide.
I will argue that such a basis exists, rooted in the types of inferences required to
answer a given question. The questions that judges call questions of fact, in other
words, are those questions calling for inductive inferences about the transactions
or occurrences in dispute in the litigation. The questions that judges call questions
of law are those questions calling for either deductive inferences or inductive
inferences leading to conclusions beyond the transactions or occurrences in
dispute. Furthermore, I will argue that the Court has already implicitly adopted
this understanding of the fact-law distinction in its most recent Seventh
Amendment decision, Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.25
In order to avoid the intractable linguistic and epistemological problems that
would beset any attempt to distinguish "facts" from "laws," my analysis focuses
entirely on questions. Rather than attempting to categorize real-world phenomena,
I will attempt to categorize questions, by reference both to the type of logic
needed to answer them and the subject matter of the inferences involved. I then
use the fact-law terminology to label the categories, with questions calling for
inductive inferences on certain topics labeled "fact questions" and questions
calling for inductive inferences on other topics and for deductive inferences
labeled "law questions." I hope to show that, whether they realize it or not, this is
what judges naturally do. This is a descriptive claim. Having made it, I will make
a normative claim that judges should assign decisional responsibility based on the
types of inferences required to answer a question.
My argument will proceed in four steps. First, in Part II, I will filter out
certain "screening" functions performed by the judge that do not implicate the
Seventh Amendment. The questions addressed in this "screening" role, although
conventionally referred to as matters of "law," form a discrete class of questions
24 See Moses, supra note 5, at 183. Professor Moses distinguishes the following "strands:"
[F]irst, the historical test of the right to a jury trial... ; second, the preservation of the
"substance" of the jury trial right, as opposed to mere matters of pleading and practice;
third, the preservation of the jury right after law and equity courts were merged in 1938;
and fourth, the creation of an exception to the Seventh Amendment guarantee for matters
which Congress has delegated for decision to non-Article III courts and administrative
agencies.
Id. at 183. She argues that Markman is an aberration best understood as an extension, in
connection with the fourth strand, of the Court's deference to specialized courts in dealing
with statutorily created public rights. Id. at 231-35.
25 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
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with factual characteristics that must be removed to understand which "fact"
questions must go to the jury. Next, in Part III, the heart of the analysis, I will
investigate the fact-law distinction from an inferential perspective. I will begin by
explaining the categories of inductive and deductive reasoning and showing how
those types of inferences arise in adjudication. I will then show how
considerations of the inferences a question requires animate the fact-law
distinction in practice by dissecting several important common-law questions.
Finally, in Part IV, I will critique the Supreme Court's recent Seventh
Amendment opinions to show how an inferential understanding of the fact-law
distinction can guide the allocation of decisional responsibility in real cases.
By concentrating on establishing a baseline for allocating decisional
responsibility consistent with Seventh Amendment prescriptions, I circumscribe
my analysis in several important respects. First, I consider only civil litigation.
The combination of a more forceful jury guarantee in the Sixth Amendment26 and
the prohibition of double jeopardy in the Fifth Amendment27 produces very
different conditions on the jury right in criminal cases. While the criteria I discuss
may have value in the criminal context, for example in allocating decisions
between the liability and penalty phases, the treatment of those issues exceeds the
scope of this work. Second, I avoid consideration of the normative justifications
for the right to a civil jury trial. A debate rages over the utility of the civil jury.2 8
Rather than take up that debate, I accept the Seventh Amendment as a societal
affirmation of the value of the civil jury and offer a way to effect the jury right
that is both logically consistent and in harmony with the language and
interpretation of the Amendment.
II. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT'S EVOLVING JURISPRUDENCE
For centuries, the black-letter rule of the common law has been that juries
decide questions of fact and judges decide questions of law.29 While the Seventh
26 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed .... ).
27 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be ... subject for the same offence to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb.. . ."). The prohibition on double jeopardy precludes the judge
from overturning a verdict for the defendant, thereby making jury nullification a possibility in
criminal cases.
28 See generally VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(containing a collection of articles by major scholars critiquing the civil jury system).
29 In reality, through the first half of the nineteenth century it was widely assumed that
juries had inherent power to decide both questions of law and questions of fact. See Paul D.
Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
33, 44 (1990) ("For much of the century following ratification of the Amendment, federal civil
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Amendment does not expressly assign all questions of fact to the jury and all
questions of law to the judge,30 it fits within that historical framework. The text of
the Amendment and relevant statutory provisions from the same time period
strongly suggest that a key feature of the jury right was the reservation of factual
decisions for the jury. Until recently, the Supreme Court's Seventh Amendment
decisions seemed to accept that idea implicitly. More recent decisions, however,
have focused on other considerations in allocating decisional responsibility. In
this Section, I trace this evolution through the Court's most recent cases.
A. Textual, Statutory, and Case Law Support for Assigning Questions of
Fact to the Jury
The Seventh Amendment expressly refers to "facts" in its second clause, the
"re-examination clause." 31 Motivated by the fear that the federal appellate
jurisdiction provided in Article III of the Constitution would allow creditors to
overturn local jury verdicts favorable to debtors,32 the re-examination clause
provides that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined.., than
according to the rules of the common law."'33 While this clause says nothing
juries were told that they were responsible for deciding law as well as fact, giving such attention
as they might choose to the judge's instructions on the law.").
30 Evidence from the historical record suggests that the drafters and ratifiers of the
Amendment saw it as a general injunction against the curtailment of civil juries, and not as an
instruction manual for allocating decisional responsibility. See Edith Guild Henderson, The
Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REv. 289, 290 (1966). Ms. Henderson
stated:
Nowhere in the history of the Philadelphia convention, the ratifying conventions of the
several states, or the specific 'legislative history' of the Bill of Rights can any evidence be
found that the relation of judge to jury was considered as affected in any but the most
general possible way by the seventh amendment, or even that it was considered at all.
Id.
31U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
32 See Charles W. Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment, 57
MINN. L. REv. 639, 673-74 (1973). Professor Wolfram explained:
One cannot read through Jonathan Elliot's collection of debates in the state ratification
conventions without being struck by the repeated connection made by antifederalist
speakers... between the right of jury trial in civil cases and the plight of debtors who
would be required to defend debt actions in the new federal courts ....
Id. Professor Wolfram quotes from the Virginia ratification debates in which Patrick Henry
railed against the Supreme Court's apparent power to hear appeals from factual questions under
Article III. Id. at 688-89.
33 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
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about what other questions may go to the jury, it suggests that questions of fact
were understood to be peculiarly the jury's province.
The Judiciary Act enacted by the first Congress supports that interpretation. 34
It provided that "the trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except
civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury."35 Although
its passage preceded the ratification of the Seventh Amendment, the Judiciary Act
provides a window into the procedural mindset of the first Congress, which
comprised many of the men who subsequently participated in the drafting and
ratification of the Bill of Rights.36 Those men would not have created a
constitutional right to a jury trial significantly different from the jury guarantee
they had imposed on federal trial courts by statute just two years earlier.37
The Supreme Court, until its recent cases, rarely faced directly the question of
whether the judge or the jury should decide a particular question. Nevertheless,
the Court's decisions generally affirmed that it is the jury's prerogative to decide
questions of fact. In its 1897 decision in Walker v. New Mexico & Southern
Pacific Railroad Co.,38 the Court concluded that the aim of the Seventh
Amendment "[i]s not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but
substance of right. This requires that questions of fact in common law actions
shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly
to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative." 39
The Court struck a similar note in Ex parte Peterson,40 in which the Court
approved tentative fact-finding by an auditor, but stated that "[t]he limitation
imposed by the Amendment is merely that enjoyment of the right of trial by jury
be not obstructed, and that the ultimate determination of issues offact by the jury
34 See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
35 1d.
36 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 11 ("The 1789 Judiciary Act... is significant
because it is the first and most authoritative expression of congressional understanding of
Article III.") (citation omitted).
37 The current Judicial Code and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also support the notion
that the determination of fact issues lies at the core of the jury right. Although the Judicial Code
no longer contains a provision expressly assigning questions of fact to the jury, it does provide
that in the unusual case of an original action in the Supreme Court against a citizen of the
United States, "issues of fact shall be tried by ajury." 28 U.S.C. § 1872 ("In all original actions
at law in the Supreme Court against citizens of the United States, issues of fact shall be tried by
a jury."). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38, the basic rule providing for jury trial in federal
district courts, provides that, where one party demands a jury trial on only some issues, the
other party may demand a jury trial on "all of the issues of fact in the action." FED. R. Civ. P.
38(c).
38 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
39 Walker v. N.M. & S. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897) (emphasis added)
(holding that where a jury's interrogatory answers conflicted with a general verdict, the trial
judge could permissibly enter judgment consistent with interrogatory answers).
40 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
2003)
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
be not interfered with."41 And in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,
Inc. ,42 the Court declared that "[a]n essential characteristic of [the federal] system
is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence-if not the command--of the
Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the
jury."43
Thus, common-law notions about the responsibilities of judges and juries, the
text of the Seventh Amendment, the original Judiciary Act, and Supreme Court
cases interpreting the Seventh Amendment all link the jury's role to deciding
questions of fact. Despite this long tradition, however, as it has addressed a
number of cases involving issues of decisional allocation in recent years, the
Court has turned away from the fact-law distinction and focused on other
considerations.
B. The Supreme Court's Recent Seventh Amendment Decisions
1. Tull v. United States
The case that begins the Court's new Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is
Tull v. United States,44 decided in 1987. The federal government sued Tull, a real
estate developer, for dumping fill on wetlands in violation of the Clean Water
Act.45 The government sought both an injunction and civil penalties under the
provision of the Act subjecting violators to "a civil penalty of not to exceed
$10,000 per day"46 during the period of the violation.47 Tull's demand for a jury
trial was denied by the district court judge.48 After a bench trial, the judge found
that Tull had illegally filled in wetland areas and imposed $325,000 in civil
penalties, plus an injunction ordering the removal of fill and restoration of the
properties still owned by Tull. Tull appealed, arguing that he was entitled to a jury
41 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920) (emphasis added).
42 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
43 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted); see also Dimick v. Shiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("The controlling
distinction between the power of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to
determine the law and the latter to determine the facts."); Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref.
Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931) ("All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of fact be
submitted for determination .....
44 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
45 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 414 (1987); see 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1344, &
1362(7) (prohibiting the discharge of fill material into navigable waters and adjacent wetlands).
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d).
47 Tull, 481 U.S. at 414-15.
48 1d at 415.
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trial under the Seventh Amendment. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that,
because the district court imposed "a 'package of remedies' containing both
equitable and legal relief with 'one part of the package affecting assessment of the
others,"' the action could not be considered one at law, to which the Seventh
Amendment jury right would apply.49
The Supreme Court first addressed the basic question of whether some jury
right applied. The Court employed a fairly standard version of its historical test,
considering both the nature of the cause of action and the remedy sought.50 Based
primarily on its conclusion that civil penalties are most closely analogous to
punitive damages, which were available only in a court of law,51 the Court held
that Tull had a right to a jury trial on at least some issues.52
Next, the Court considered whether that right extended to the assessment of
the civil penalties. Its analysis of that question was brief and essentially
conclusory. The Court found that the Seventh Amendment operates to preserve
"[o]nly those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of
the essence of the system of trial by jury .... 53 The Court concluded that,
because Congress has the power to fix civil penalties statutorily, the assessment of
civil penalties is not a "fundamental element of a jury trial."' 54 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, Congress may appropriately delegate that responsibility to
judges.55
Tull marks an important shift because the Court for the first time expressly
separated out the two different jury-right questions: first, the Court analyzed
whether there is any right to a jury, and then it asked whether a specific question
must be decided by the jury. Tull is also important because it does not talk about
the jury's function in terms of deciding questions of fact. Still, the Court's focus
4 9 Id. at 416 (quoting Tull v. United States, 769 F.2d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 1985)).
50 Id. at 417 ("To determine whether a statutory action is more similar to cases that were
tried in courts of law than to suits tried in courts of equity or admiralty, the Court must examine
both the nature of the action and of [sic] the remedy sought.").51 Id. at 423.
52 Id. at 424-25. The Court rejected the appellate court's rationale for calling the entire
remedy equitable. "[I]f a legal claim is joined with an equitable claim, the right to jury trial on
the legal claim, including all issues common to both claims, remains intact. The right cannot be
abridged by characterizing the legal claim as 'incidental' to the equitable relief sought." Id. at
425 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.1 1(1974)).
53 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987) (quoting Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S.
149, 156 n.11 (1973)).
54 Id.
55 Id. at 426-27. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, dissented. He pointed out that,
while Congress could choose to create a statutory cause of action with a fixed recovery, it did
not do so in this case. Id. at 427 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, it provided for a recovery very
similar to a punitive damage award, to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Scalia argued that,
just as punitive damages are typically assessed by a jury, this civil penalty should be assessed
by the jury. Id. at 428 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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on "incidents fundamental" to the jury right arguably incorporates the notion that
juries must decide questions of fact. In subsequent decisions, however, the Court
seemed to move further away from that position.
2. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.
After Tull, almost a decade passed before the Court again considered the
allocation of decisional responsibility under the Seventh Amendment. But its next
decision, in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,56 brought on a flurry of
decisions on the subject. Markman has been widely critiqued and criticized for its
impact on patent litigation. On a more general level, though, it has become the
leading opinion governing the roles of judge and jury under the Seventh
Amendment. It is, therefore, especially significant for this analysis.
Marknan involved a patent infringement claim relating to a dry-cleaning
inventory control system.57 The distinguishing feature of the plaintiff Markman's
system was its ability to monitor inventory throughout the cleaning process and
generate reports about an item's location and status.58 Westview developed a
product that recorded an inventory of receivables, but did not track and record the
actual items of clothing.59 Marknan brought suit for patent infringement. The
case was tried to a jury, which returned a verdict for Markman. Westview moved
for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that the term "inventory" in the claims in
Markman's patent encompassed both cash inventory and actual items of
clothing.60 Since Westview's product did not track items of clothing, Westview
argued, it did not infringe on Markman's patent. The trial judge agreed and
granted Westview's motion.
Markman appealed, arguing that the trial judge impermissibly usurped the
jury's function under the Seventh Amendment by deciding the claim-construction
question as a matter of law.61 The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding that the
interpretation of the claims in a patent is a question of law for the judge to
decide. 62 Markman appealed to the Supreme Court, which also affirmed, in a
unanimous opinion.
Citing Tull, the Supreme Court described its inquiry as a two-step
process. In the first step, the Court asks "whether [it is] dealing with a cause
of action that either was tried at law at the time of the founding or is at least
56 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
57 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996).
58Id.
59 Id. at 374-75.
60 Id. at 375.
61 Id. at 376.
62 Id.
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analogous to one that was." 63 Then, if it concludes that the action fits within
the law category, the Court asks "whether the particular trial decision must
fall to the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as
it existed in 1791." 64 On the first issue, the Court needed only two sentences
to conclude that, because patent infringement actions were tried to a jury in
1791, this case also required a jury trial. 65
On the second issue-the important one both in the case and in this
analysis-the Court's approach was more involved and less consistent with prior
practice. Although earlier decisions had described the function of the Seventh
Amendment as "preserving the substance of the common-law right" to a jury,
they had linked the "substance of the right" to the determination of facts.
Apparently the first case to use that language was Walker v. New Mexico &
Southern Pacific Railroad Co. ,66 in which the Court said that the purpose of the
Seventh Amendment "is not to preserve mere matters of form and procedure but
substance of right."67 The Court immediately followed that statement by
announcing that "[t]his requires that questions of fact in common law actions
shall be settled by a jury."68 Similarly, in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin
Refining Co.,6 9 the Court declared that "the Constitution is concerned, not with
form, but with substance. All of vital significance in trial by jury is that issues of
fact be submitted for determination [by the jury]." 70
But in Markman, the Court divorced the "substance of the right" from the
question of fact determination.71 Declaring that claim construction is a "mongrel
practice"--apparently in the sense of being a "mixed question of law and fact"-
the Court proposed using the historical method to determine whether it should be
performed by the jury.72 Almost immediately, however, the Court found that
historical analysis could not provide a definite answer. "Prior to 1790 nothing in
the nature of a claim had appeared either in British patent practice or in that of the
American states ... and we have accordingly found no direct antecedent of
63 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 376 (1996)..
64 Id. at 376.
65 Id. at 377.
66 165 U.S. 593 (1897).
67 Walker v. New Mexico & S. Pac. R. R. Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897).
68 Id.
69 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
70 Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494, 498 (1931).
71 Tull had also talked about "the substance of the right" without mentioning the fact-law
distinction, but that seemed to stem from the Tull Court's sense that remedies issues fall outside
the fact-law firamework. See Tull, 481 U.S. at 426-27. Marknan, in contrast, involves the
interpretation of writings, a classic fact-law battleground.
72 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 378 (1996).
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modem claim construction in the historical sources." 73 Undaunted, the Court
searched for analogous cases, but still could do no better than to find that judges
generally interpreted written documents at common law.74
At last conceding that the historical analysis was inconclusive, the Court
decided to "look elsewhere" to allocate responsibility for claim construction. 75 It
turned to "existing precedent and... the relative interpretive skills of judges and
juries and the statutory policies that ought to be furthered by the allocation." 76 At
this point, inevitably, the Court again ran into the fact-law distinction. Its search
for relevant precedent led it to Justice Curtis's conclusion in Winans v.
Denmead77 that construing the patent and the claim specifications therein "is a
question of law, to be determined by the court," while determining whether
infringement occurred "is a question of fact, to be submitted to a jury. 78
Markman countered by pointing to the later decision in Bischoffv. Wethered,79 in
which the Court held that, in a breach of contract claim involving the validity of a
patent, the jury should construe the claims in the patent.80 The Markman Court
distinguished Bischoffon the ground that it was not a patent infringement case, so
that the construction of the claim in that context presented a different kind of
issue. But the Court had enough doubt about the matter to say that precedent
provided no clear answer.81
Finally, the Court turned to "functional considerations," noting that "when an
issue 'falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple historical
fact, the fact-law distinction at times has turned on a determination that, as a
matter of the sound administration ofjustice, one judicial actor is better positioned
than another to decide the issue in question.' 82 Citing the "highly technical"
73 Id. at 378-79.
74 Id. at 381-82 ("[W]e do know that in other kinds of cases during this period judges, not
juries, ordinarily construed written documents.").
75 Id. at 384.
7 6 1d.
77 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330 (1853).
78 Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 330, 338 (1853).
79 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
80 Bischoffv. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 815 (1869).
81 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996).
82 Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)). The Court's reliance on Miller
is inapposite, because Miller did not address the allocation of responsibility between judge and
jury. Miller was a habeas corpus case in which the convicted defendant claimed that his
custodial confession should have been suppressed as involuntary by the state trial court. The
federal district court dismissed the habeas petition and the Third Circuit affirmed, holding that
the voluntariness of the confession was a "factual issue" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
commands deference to state court findings-of-fact. Miller, 474 U.S. at 108. The Supreme
Court reversed that decision, concluding that voluntariness is either a legal question or a mixed
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nature of patents, and noting that "[t]he construction of written instruments is one
of those things that judges often do and are likely to do better than jurors
unburdened by training in exegesis," the Court found that "judges, not juries, are
the better suited to find the acquired meaning of patent terms." 83 Based on that
conclusion, the Court held that the judge may permissibly construe the claims in a
patent.
Markman solidifies the basic distinction enunciated in Tull between the issues
of whether the jury right applies at all and whether a particular question must be
decided by the jury. But Markman moves the analysis of the latter issue in a
different direction by applying to it the historical and law-equity tests traditionally
used to evaluate the former issue. Furthermore, it adds an entirely new component
by introducing the notion of functional considerations into the analysis of
decisional responsibility.
3. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.84
The next case the Court considered, Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television,
Inc.,85 reprises the issues raised in Tull and in some respects repudiates Tull. Elvin
Feltner owned a company, Krypton International, operating three television
stations. Krypton became delinquent in paying royalties for programs it licensed
from Columbia. Columbia terminated the license agreements, but Krypton
continued to air the programs. Columbia brought suit for copyright infringement,
ultimately seeking statutory damages under the Copyright Act of 1976. The
district court granted Columbia summary judgment on the issue of liability.86 The
district court then denied Feltner's request for a jury trial on the question of the
amount of damages.87 The court held a bench trial on damages and awarded
Columbia the maximum available statutory damages, in the sum of $8.8
question of law and fact, and that in either case it is subject to plenary federal review. Id. at
110-12.
Volunatriness is an aspect of the decision as to whether a particular datum-the
confession-should be put before the ultimate decision maker. This kind of preliminary
question on what evidence may be put before the decision maker is always decided by the
judge. Miller is thus a case asking which judge should decide a question that only a judge can
decide. Although the issue is framed in terms of the distinction between factual and legal
determinations, it does not implicate the Seventh Amendment's right to a jury trial. To the
extent the question of whether a trial judge or appellate judge should decide a legal question
raises constitutional concerns, they involve the due process clause.
83 Id. The Court also concluded that importance of uniformity in the treatment of a patent
was reason to assign claim construction to a judge, whose decision becomes precedent available
in future cases involving the same product. Id. at 390.
84 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
85 Id
86 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 342-43 (1998).
87Id. at 344.
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million.88 After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the award, Feltner appealed to the
Supreme Court, arguing that the refusal to grant a jury trial on the damages
question violated the Seventh Amendment.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Seventh Amendment required
a jury trial on the damages question. 89 The Court first found that the Copyright
Act could not be read to grant a jury trial on statutory damages, so that the Court
could not avoid the constitutional question.90 The Court then addressed
Columbia's primary argument, that the Seventh Amendment does not require a
jury trial on the statutory damages question because statutory damages are an
equitable remedy. Applying the historical test, the Court found that copyright
suits for money damages were considered "legal" rather than "equitable" at
common law.91 Because copyright suits for money damages had historically been
tried to juries, the Court held that the Seventh Amendment required a jury trial in
this case. Finally, the Court held that the specific question of the amount of
statutory damages had to go to the jury, based on the traditional preference for
jury determinations of damages and on the fact that under the Copyright Act of
1831 juries had determined statutory damages. The Court distinguished Tull,
noting that there had been no evidence in Tull that juries historically determined
the amount of civil penalties paid to the government and that civil penalties are
analogous to sentencing in a criminal proceeding. 92
Like the decision in Markman, the Court's decision in Feltner both reiterates
and blurs the distinction between the issues of whether some right to a jury
applies and whether the jury should decide a particular question. Under
established precedent, for better or worse, the former turns on the law-equity
distinction, analyzed through the historical test. The Court properly invoked that
test to decide that a jury right applies in a copyright damages case. Like the
Markman Court, however, the Feltner Court then extended the historical analysis
to the analytically distinct question of whether a jury should decide on the amount
of statutory damages.
88 Id
89 Id. at 355.
90 Id. at 345-47.
91 Id. at 351-52.
92 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998). The Court
hinted that Tull might have been wrongly decided:
It should be noted that Tull is at least in tension with Bank of Hamilton v. Lessee of Dudley,
2 Pet. 492 (1829), in which the Court held in light of the Seventh Amendment that a jury
must determine the amount of compensation for improvements to real estate, and with
Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 .... in which the Court held that the Seventh Amendment
bars the use of additur.
Id. at 355, n.9.
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4. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.
Like Feltner, City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.93 relies heavily on
language from Maronan. But where the Court in Feltner found a basis for
decision in historical analysis, the Court in Del Monte Dunes ostensibly relied on
Markman's "functional considerations" to determine whether the judge or jury
should decide a takings question.
Del Monte Dunes owned an ocean-front parcel of land, which it hoped to
develop.94 The City of Monterey rejected five development applications over five
years, each time imposing more rigorous conditions. 95 At last, Del Monte Dunes
became convinced that the city would not permit development under any
circumstances and brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging due
process and equal protection violations and an unconstitutional regulatory
taking.96 The district court granted Del Monte Dunes' request for a jury trial on
the takings and equal protections claims, but denied it on the substantive due
process claim, reserving that claim for itself.97
The takings claim became the key point of contention. The district court
instructed the jury that it should find for Del Monte Dunes on the takings claim
"if it found either that Del Monte Dunes had been denied all economically viable
use of its property or that the city's decision to reject the plaintiff's 190 unit
development proposal did not substantially advance a legitimate public
purpose."9 8 The court also issued the following instructions explaining what the
jury needed to determine to establish either of those propositions:
For the purpose of a taking claim, you will find that the plaintiff has been
denied all economically viable use of its property, if, as the result of the city's
regulatory decision there remains no permissible or beneficial use for that
property ....
Public bodies, such as the city, have the authority to take actions which
substantially advance legitimate public interest[s] and legitimate public
interest[s] can include protecting the environment, preserving open space
agriculture, protecting the health and safety of its citizens, and regulating the
quality of the community by looking at development. So one of your jobs as
jurors is to decide if the city's decision here substantially advanced any such
legitimate public purpose.
93 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
94 Id. at 693-94.
95 Id. at 695-98.
96 Id. at 698.
97 Id. at 699.
98 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 700 (1999) (internal quotes
omitted).
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The regulatory actions of the city or any agency substantially advanc[e] a
legitimate public purpose if the action bears a reasonable relationship to that
objective .... 99
The jury returned a general verdict for Del Monte Dunes on the takings claim and
awarded $1.45 million in compensatory damages.100 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
and the City of Monterey appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, among other
things, that the question of liability on the regulatory takings claim should not
have been sent to the jury. 01
Citing Markman, the Supreme Court again described its inquiry as a two-step
process in which the Court must determine first whether the cause of action
triggers some jury right and second whether the particular decision "must fall to
the jury in order to preserve the substance of the common-law right as it existed in
1791. '1102 Applying the historical test, the Court easily dispensed with the first
question. The Court found that an action for compensation for a constitutional
violation is analogous to a tort action for damages, and so constitutes an action at
law to which a jury right attaches. 10 3
On the second question, the Court again looked to Markman, stating that it
determines which issues must go to the jury by the historical method, and when
history does not provide a clear answer, by looking to precedent and functional
considerations. 10 4 As in Markman, the Court's historical analysis failed to
provide a definitive answer. 10 5 Its examination of precedent also proved
inconclusive. 10 6 Accordingly, the Court turned to "functional considerations."
The functional analysis, however, focused almost exclusively on the fact-law
distinction. The Court began by noting that "[i]n actions at law predominantly
factual issues are in most cases allocated to the jury." 107 It then cited its takings
precedents for the proposition that "determinations of liability in regulatory
takings cases [are] 'essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries,' .. , requiring complex
factual assessments of the purposes and economic effects of government
actions."'108 It concluded that "the issue [of] whether a landowner has been
deprived of all economically viable use of his property is a predominantly factual
9 9 Id. at 700-01.
100 Id. at 701.
101 Id. at 702. The city had conceded that it was appropriate for the jury to decide on the
amount of the award. Id. at 707.
102 Id. at 708.
103 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 710-11 (1999).
104 Id. at 718.
105Id. at 718-19.
106 Id. at 719-20.
107 Id. at 720.
108 Id. (internal quotes omitted).
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question."'10 9 The Court found the question of whether the regulation substantially
advances legitimate public interests to be a mixed question of law and fact. But it
concluded that the question was so "essentially fact-bound in nature" that it
required a jury decision. 1 0 Finally, in responding to the city's argument that
submitting the latter question to the jury would trench on government's ability to
set land-use policy, the Court noted that "the determination whether the statutory
purposes were legitimate, or whether the purposes, though legitimate, were
furthered by the law or general policy, might well fall within the province of the
judge." 11
Del Monte Dunes, while purporting to follow Markman's analytical
framework, in fact swings back toward the fact-law distinction as a basis-or at
least as a justification-for assigning a particular decision to the jury instead of to
the judge. It is important because it suggests that Markman's "functional
considerations" may do no more than enshrine the fact-law distinction. It does
not, however, provide any significant analysis into how a "fact question" should
be identified. The Court's most recent Seventh Amendment decision, though,
does at least suggest an answer to that problem.
5. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.
The final installment of the Court's recent series of cases allocating decisional
responsibility under the Seventh Amendment, Cooper Industries, Inc. v.
Leatherman Tool Group, Inc.,112 involved an application of the re-examination
clause rather than the trial-by-jury clause. It thus presents somewhat different
problems than the previous four cases did. Nevertheless, it is important because of
its treatment of the fact-law dichotomy.
Cooper and Leatherman were competitors manufacturing multi-function
tools similar to the classic Swiss Army knife." 3 After Cooper used a retouched
photo of Leatherman's product in advertisements, Leatherman brought suit
against Cooper alleging trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false
advertising under the Lanham Act, plus common-law unfair competition. 114 After
trial, the case was sent to a jury with special interrogatories. 115 The jury found
that Cooper had engaged in false advertising and unfair competition, among other
things, and awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages. 116 It then found that
109 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 720 (1999).
11°Id at 721.
I'' Id. at 722.
112 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
113 Id. at 427.
114 Id at 427-28.
115 Id. at 428.
116 Id. at 429.
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Cooper had either "acted with malice or shown a reckless and outrageous
indifference to a highly unreasonable risk of harm and acted with a conscious
indifference to Leatherman's rights." 1 7 Based on that finding, the jury awarded
$4.5 million in punitive damages." 8 Cooper asked the district court to reduce the
punitive award on due process grounds, and when it refused, Cooper appealed
that decision. 119 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to reduce the award. 120 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Cooper argued that the Ninth Circuit had applied an improper standard in
the review of the district court's decision. 121 The Supreme Court agreed, holding
that the court of appeals should have reviewed the constitutionality of the punitive
award de novo. 122
In the Supreme Court, Leatherman argued against the de novo standard on
the ground that appellate review of the district court's determination that the
punitive award was constitutional was improper under the Seventh Amendment's
re-examination clause. 123 At common law, only a trial judge could set aside a jury
verdict for excessiveness, and appellate review of a trial judge's decision not to
set aside a verdict was deemed a violation of the Seventh Amendment. 124 The
Court held in Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., however, that an appellate
court could review a trial judge's decision not to set aside a compensatory award
on an abuse-of-discretion standard. 125 Leatherman contended that, to the extent
an appellate court could review a trial judge's decision not to set aside a punitive
award, it should be on the same abuse-of-discretion standard. 126
The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that "[b]ecause the jury's award of
punitive damages does not constitute a finding of 'fact,' appellate review of the
District Court's determination that an award is consistent with due process does
not implicate the Seventh Amendment concerns raised by [Leatherman] .... 127
Its reasoning on this point is significant, because it demonstrates a relatively
nuanced sense of the distinction between factual and legal questions. The Court
first noted that "[u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a
question of historical or predictive fact... the level of punitive damages is not
117 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,429 (2001).
S18 Id. at 428-29.
119Id. at 429.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 431.
122 Id. at 436.
123 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,437 (2001).
124 Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,434 (1996).
125 Id. at 435.
126 Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437.
127 Id.
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really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."'' 2 8 Responding to Leatherman's contention that
punitive damages have historically been considered the province of the jury, the
Court described the shift from a "compensatory" to a "punitive" or "exemplary"
theory of punitive damages. 129 Where in the past, punitive damages had provided
compensation for intangible or other injuries not available as compensatory
damages, today punishment is the primary purpose.' 30 The Court noted that the
shift entails a transition from a more to a less factual inquiry.13'
Although this discussion is not fully developed, it suggests an understanding
of the fact-law distinction--and its role vis-A-vis the Seventh Amendment-
rooted in inferential processes at work in answering a particular question. The
Court saw that "factual" questions are characterized by "historical" or
"predictive" inferences. It then distinguished the "factual" question of
compensation, a question that requires inductive inferences about the subject
matter of the dispute, from the non-factual question of the appropriate punishment
for a wrongdoer, a question involving primarily considerations of fairness and
justice. The Court noted that the punitive damage determination rests on
consideration of factual elements, including "[t]he defendant's motive," but
suggested that those elements should be decided by the jury and could not be
disregarded by a reviewing court.1 32
Cooper is the jumping-off point for my analysis of the fact-law distinction
and its role in allocating decisional responsibility under the Seventh Amendment.
I will argue that, as the Cooper Court suggested, it is possible to distinguish
questions of fact from questions of law based on the kinds of inferences required
to answer them. I will then argue that courts should use such an inferential
analysis in determining whether the judge or jury should decide a particular
question under the Seventh Amendment.
III. AN INFERENTIAL ACCOUNT OF THE FACT-LAW DISTINCTION
Providing an inferential account of the fact-law distinction and its application
in the Seventh Amendment context requires two steps. The first step involves
identifying those questions which a jury may answer. The vast majority of
decisions made during the course of litigation are exclusively the province of the
judge. Juries are simply not eligible to decide the many procedural and
preliminary questions that arise prior to and during trial. Instead, the judge
answers these kinds of questions in what I call the judicial screening function. The
12 8 Id. (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
12 9 1d. 437-38.
130 Id. at 437-38 n. 11.
131 Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 437-38 n.11
(2001).
132 1d. at 439n.12.
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questions a judge answers while performing this function, questions which are
colloquially called "questions of law," must be removed from the analysis to
allow focus on the types of questions that juries are eligible to answer. Having
done that, the second step in the analysis involves the more complex problem of
identifying the questions the jury must answer.
The key to this analysis is to keep in mind that, in an adversarial system such
as ours, the decision makers-be they judges, juries, or some other kind of
referee--do not have the power to seek out and resolve disputes. 133 Instead, the
decisional process is instigated and guided by the parties, acting through their
lawyers. The process begins when one of the parties initiates the adjudication by
invoking the power of a court. The parties then set the machinery of decision in
motion by a two-step process: First, one or both parties put before the tribunal a
body of data on which a decision may be based; then the parties submit a question
or questions to be answered in reference to the data. Either the judge or the jury
then answers the questions based on the data. This process recurs throughout the
litigation, first through the submission of motions and later through the
introduction of evidence at trial and the submission of jury instructions. At each
stage, a determination must be made, by the judge, as to who should answer the
questions.
A. Identifying the Questions the Jury is Eligible to Answer
Judges have an exclusive role in the adjudicative process that, while often
referred to under the rubric "law," involves many questions of fact. This role,
which I call the "judicial screening role," entails regulating the actions of the
parties to ensure that the adjudicative process unfolds in a way that comports with
systemic norms. In the screening role, the judge makes many decisions involving
the "facts" of the case. Nevertheless, these decisions are not understood to
implicate the Seventh Amendment. Although the allocation of these decisions to
the judge is often justified by calling them matters of "law," that term, when
invoked to describe these sorts of supervisory decisions, has a different sense than
when invoked to describe questions that may be posed to the jury.134 Decisions
made in the screening role are called decisions of "law" merely as a matter of
convention rather than in counterpoint to decisions of "fact." What distinguishes
these screening decisions from those that may go to the jury is not the nature of
the inquiry but its function. As long as the decisions serve the purpose of
13 3 See WILLIAM BURNHAM, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES 78 (2d ed. 1999) ("The most fundamental principle of the adversary system is
its insistence upon strictly separating the active function of investigating and gathering evidence
from the more passive function of considering the evidence and deciding the case.").
134 See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CAL. L.
REv. 1867, 1867-72 (1966) (distinguishing "questions of law" relating to governing rules from
application of "law" to "fact" in specific cases).
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regulating the way in which the parties have set an issue up for decision, they fall
within the judge's exclusive authority. There are three basic types of questions in
this class; I will briefly discuss each of them.
The first type of decision in this class addresses the propriety of the chosen
forum. Although the parties initially select the forum, they are not free to choose
any court for the resolution of their dispute. The court must have power both over
the subject matter of the dispute and over the parties themselves. 135 In other
words, the court must have both subject-matter and personal jurisdiction.136
Decisions as to whether jurisdiction is proper are made by the judge.' 37 These
decisions take many different forms; some of the more common forms involve
questions about whether a long-arm statute is satisfied, 138 whether process has
been adequately served, 139 whether the requirement of diversity is satisfied, 140
and whether a federal statute might govern the ultimate disposition of the case.14 1
These kinds of questions routinely require inferences about the parties and the
nature of the dispute that are clearly factual in my sense. Nevertheless, they are
reserved for the judge. 142
Once the judge determines that the dispute is in a proper forum, the parties
move the litigation toward resolution by the two-step process of presenting data to
135 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 8-10 (providing overview ofjurisdiction).
136 See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 2 (providing jurisdictional bases).
137 See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(d) (providing that jurisdictional defenses shall be heard and
determined before trial unless court orders their deferral to trial); Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66,
71-72 (1939) ("As there is no statutory direction for procedure upon an issue ofjurisdiction, the
mode of its determination is left to the trial court."). Subject-matter jurisdiction is one of the few
areas in which the judge may make a decision without any impetus from the parties. See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 12 ("If a subject-matter jurisdiction defect exists, it may
be raised at any time, even on appeal, and the court is under a duty to point it out if the parties
do not.").
138 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 141-44 (describing long-arm statutes).
139 See FED. R. Civ. P. 4 (providing guidelines for service of process).
140 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000) (providing requirements for diversity jurisdiction);
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity of parties).
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.");
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 15 ("The most difficult single problem in determining
whether federal question jurisdiction exists.., is deciding when the relation of federal law to a
case is such that the action may be said to be one 'arising under' that law.").
142 Sometimes, most prominently in cases invoking federal question jurisdiction, those
factual inferences take on such significance as to require a jury decision. The Supreme Court
has held that where the jurisdictional issues and the "merits" are inextricably intertwined, a jury
decision may be required. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735-39 (1947) (holding that a trial
on the merits is required when jurisdiction turns on the merits). See also 8 JAMES WM. MOORE,
MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.34 (3rd ed. 2003) (describing availability of jury trial
regarding procedural matters); Note, Trial by Jury of Preliminary Jurisdictional Facts in
Federal Courts, 48 IOWA L. REv. 471 (1963) (same).
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the decision maker and posing questions relating to the data. Questions about the
data to be presented and the questions to be posed are the second and third main
types of questions in this class.
Decisions about what data is appropriate are made both before and during
trial. Before trial, the parties offer data on paper, through the pleadings and
through affidavits, deposition transcripts, and other materials appended to
motions. At trial, data is offered through oral argument, through live testimony of
witnesses, and through the introduction of tangible objects. The judge determines
whether the data the parties offer is appropriate, by reference to the rules of civil
procedure and the rules of evidence. 143 The judge may reject data on a variety of
mostly policy-based grounds; some of the more important are the rules excluding
privileged information, 144 hearsay, 145 and character evidence.146 In addition, the
judge may conclude that a given datum, although not covered by an exclusionary
rule, has no utility for the determination of the matter and so should not be
considered.' 47 Or, in the alternative, the judge may conclude that a given datum
must be accepted as true, even if related questions ultimately go to the jury. 148
These decisions about the data submitted involve a wide variety of questions
that are "factual" in my sense. Often they require express inductive conclusions
about the events in dispute. For example, many hearsay exceptions turn on the
circumstances surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement. 149 Those
circumstances may be identical to the circumstances that led to the dispute and so
143 See GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 8-9 (3d ed.
1996) (describing judge's role in resolving factual disputes in pre-trial motions and as incident
to the admission of evidence at trial).
144 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 126-43 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999)
(outlining evidentiary privileges).
145 See FED. R. EvID. 801-07.
14 6 See FED. R. EVID. 404-05.
147 See FED. R. EVID. 401-03. The judge may exclude any evidence that has no tendency
to make a fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable. FED. R.
EVID. 401-02. Furthermore, even if evidence has some tendency to make a fact of consequence
more or less probable, the judge may exclude it if the judge concludes that the risks of "unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or [] considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence" substantially outweigh its
probative value. FED. R. EVID. 403.
148 See FED. R. EVID. 201 (giving court authority to take judicial notice of information
"not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial
jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned").
149 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) (establishing a hearsay exclusion that turns on
agency relationship between the party and declarant); FED. R. EVID. 803(1) (providing for a
hearsay exception that turns on whether the declarant made the statement while perceiving the
described event); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) (granting a hearsay exception that turns on whether
declarant had a belief in impending death at the time that the statement was made).
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lie at the heart of the litigation.' 50 Nevertheless, the jury plays virtually no role in
answering these questions.' 51
More problematic is the issue of whether a question posed by a party is
appropriate. Judges, through their legal training and experience, are inculcated
into a legal culture in which they have certain background understandings of what
is "law" and a common sense of the sources to which they can look to find more
"law." 152 There is no definition of "law" and no list of sources containing "law."
Actors in the legal system define "law" on an ongoing basis by their conduct.153
Most judges seem to lean heaviest on sources such as cases, statutes, and treatises,
as well as on the judge's notions of justice, fairness, and public policy, not to
mention the judge's personal biases and prejudices. 154
150 See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (stating that the hearsay exclusion, often invoked in
conspiracy cases, turns on whether the statement was made during the course of, and in the
furtherance of, a conspiracy).
151 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 9 A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2550 (3d ed. 1940) ("The admissibility of a given
piece of evidence is for the judge to determine."). This is arguably an overly simplistic approach
to the admissibility calculus. In several places, the Federal Rules of Evidence confer on the jury
the power to decide ultimately whether evidence is admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 602,
901, 1008. In a well-known article, Professor John Kaplan dissected these rules to show how
difficult it can be to figure out whether the judge or the jury should determine admissibility. See
John Kaplan, Of Mabrus and Zorgs-An Essay in Honor of David Louisell, 66 CAL. L. REV.
987 (1978). But the complexities Professor Kaplan and others have uncovered have little
practical effect for my analysis. In each case in which the jury nominally decides on
admissibility, the judge decides whether the jury ever gets to consider the evidence, based on
his determination of whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that the evidence is
what it is purported to be. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) ("When the relevancy of evidence depends
upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it upon, or subject to, the
introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.").
Thus, the judge in all situations decides whether the parties will be able to rely on any given
datum. That question, rather than any ultimate conclusion of "admissibility," is the one that
concerns me.
152 See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 126 -27 (1989).
15 3 See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001).
154 See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
Cardozo stated:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of information do I appeal for
guidance?... If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? If no precedent is
applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make a precedent for the future? If I am
seeking logical consistency, the symmetry of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At
what point shall the quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of
the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and morals? Into that
strange compound which is brewed daily in the caldron of the courts, all these ingredients
enter in varying proportions.
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When a litigant poses a question, the judge has to decide whether that
question "fits" with the law as the judge constructs it in accordance with her
background knowledge and research. Assume, for example, that a litigant who is
a public official claims that he has been defamed. He asserts that the dispositive
question in the case is whether the defendant acted negligently in publishing
untruthful and injurious statements about him. The judge will (probably) refuse to
allow that question to be asked because the question is not "appropriate." Sources
with broadly recognized authority indicate that the more appropriate question is
whether the defendant acted with actual malice in publishing untruthful and
injurious statements about the plaintiff.155
Decisions about whether a particular question is appropriate appear in several
different manifestations. One of the most obvious is the ruling on a motion to
dismiss. Where a plaintiff raises a novel theory of recovery, the defendant may
move to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 156 In doing so, the defendant
effectively asks the court to decide whether a question proposed by the plaintiff is
appropriate. 157 If the judge finds that it is inappropriate, the judge dismisses the
claim turning on the answer to that question. Later in the proceedings, in
conjunction with the trial, the parties submit proposed jury instructions. 158 The
submission of proposed jury instructions is simply the suggestion of questions to
be posed to the jury. The judge decides whether the questions the parties propose
are appropriate, and may even formulate questions himself.' 59 Similar decisions
may be made implicitly or explicitly at other points in the litigation, such as on
summary judgment160 and in discovery and evidentiary rulings.16'
Note that, in the defamation example, the judge did not have to draw any
conclusions about what actually occurred leading to the dispute. She could make
155 See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
156 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
157 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 303 (stating that motion to dismiss for
failure to state claim "asks whether, if all the allegations are true, the pleader has stated a valid
claim or defense under the law").
158 See FED. R. CIv. P. 51 ("At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the
trial as the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct the
jury on the law as set forth in the requests.").
159 See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 8, at 480 ("The court, after consultation with and
sometimes argument by the parties, determines which of these to give and which of its own to
add or substitute.").
160 See FED. R. Civ. P. 56. Very often summary judgment motions involve the same sorts
of arguments raised in motions to dismiss, and the civil rules even provide for motions to
dismiss to be treated as summary judgment motions under certain circumstances. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(c).
161 In the context of discovery and evidentiary rulings, the judge may decide that certain
data should not be considered because the questions to which it would be relevant are not
appropriate. Although the decision comes out as a decision that data should not be put before
the court, it is really a decision that a proposed question should not be asked.
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a decision about the appropriateness of the question looking only at the
question. 162 Often, however, decisions at this stage strike at the gray area between
a decision that a question is inappropriate in the abstract and a decision that a
question must be answered a particular way given the facts of the case. 163 It is
now beyond dispute that judges have limited power to make decisions of the latter
type. 164 But the standard is high. The judge must be convinced that, given the
data put forward by the parties, reasonable people could answer the question only
one way. 165 In modem parlance, these decisions are called judgments as a matter
of law. They occur most obviously in the context of motions to dismiss and
motions for summary judgment and by way of the trial and post-trial rulings
162 Decisions purely on the "appropriateness" of a question posed do not raise questions
of fact under my theory; they do not require inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute. They may, of course, be considered "factual" in some other sense. See
Gary Lawson, Proving the Law, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 (1992) (arguing that legal propositions
are themselves "factual" propositions that must be proved using standards similar to those used
to prove facts).
163 See Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966). Evans, a suit against
General Motors for injuries sustained in a car accident, shows the interplay between the judge's
authority to regulate the questions posed and the judge's power to decide questions where there
is no reasonable dispute as to the answer. The plaintiff alleged that the car was made with an X
frame, which provided less protection in a crash than a perimeter frame would have. Id. at 823.
The plaintiff asked for a determination that "the collision which occurred was a foreseeable
emergency and that by omitting side frame rails, defendant created an unreasonable risk of
harm to occupants of the automobile it manufactured." Id. at 824. In other words, the plaintiff
wanted liability to hinge on the question, "Was the collision foreseeable?" The defendant
moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the determinative question was not
whether the collision was foreseeable, but whether defendant had "design[ed] its automobile to
be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made." Id. at 826 (Kiley, J., dissenting). The
court agreed that the defendant's question was the appropriate one, calling its resolution of that
issue a "matter of law." Id. Furthermore, the court answered the question itself, finding that
"[t]he intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with
other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions
may occur." Id. at 825. Although it did not say so explicitly, the court necessarily found that the
defendant's question could be answered only one way. Cf Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495, 498, 502-03 (8th Cir. 1968) (citing Evans but finding that collisions are a part of the
intended use of an automobile).
164 See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1) ("If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on
an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that
party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against that party and may grant a motion
for judgment as a matter of law....").
165 See Simblest v. Maynard, 427 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1970) ("[The test] is whether the
evidence is such that, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering
the weight of the evidence, there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable
[persons] could have reached.").
11512003]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
traditionally known as the directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV). 166
A decision that a question could be answered only one way typically involves
inferences of fact as I define them. Nevertheless, courts have consistently held
that judges may make these decisions without violating the Seventh Amendment.
In the leading case, Galloway v. United States,167 the Supreme Court reviewed a
district court's grant of a directed verdict for the government at the close of
evidence in the plaintiffs suit seeking disability benefits under a government
insurance contract. 168 The central issue was whether the plaintiffs disability
existed as of the date the insurance lapsed. 169 The Court reviewed the evidence in
the record in detail, focusing on the plaintiffs failure to present any evidence of
his disability during the eight years following the lapse of the policy. 170
Concluding that that "[n]o favorable inference can be drawn from the omission,"
the Court affirmed. 17 1 Despite the factual character of this determination, the
Court found no Seventh Amendment violation in the directed verdict practice. 172
The Court noted that the Seventh Amendment "requires that the jury be allowed
to make reasonable inferences from facts proven in evidence having a reasonable
tendency to sustain them.... But it does not require that... the jury be permitted
to make inferences from the withholding of crucial facts .... -173 Where the
evidence supporting a proposition is overwhelming, or, as in Galloway, where
there is no evidence for a proposition, a jury decision would add nothing; by
definition, a question about such a proposition could be answered only one way.
In sum, the judge has the authority-almost always exercised only at the
behest of the parties-to make a number of screening decisions. First, she decides
whether the case is in an appropriate forum. Then she decides what data may be
relied upon in deciding any question, as well as whether a proposed question is
appropriate. Finally, she has the authority to decide whether reasonable minds
could differ on a question posed. If a question could be answered only one way
because the evidence is either absent or overwhelming, the judge simply decides
it accordingly. But if the question could be answered more than one way, and one
166 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 2521 (describing historical background to
Rule 50).
167 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
168 Id. at 373. The plaintiff Galloway had served in World War I and was insured by
contract under the War Risk Insurance Act. Id. at 372. He stopped paying the premiums in
1919. Id. Thereafter, his mental condition deteriorated until, by 1934, he was "totally and
permanently disabled by reason of insanity ..." Id. at 374. His wife brought suit in his name to
recover benefits under the War Risk policy. Id.
169 Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 375 (1943).
170 Id. at 375-86.
171 Id. at 386.
172 Id. at 395.
173 Id. at 396.
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of the parties demands a jury decision, the judge must determine whether she or
the jury should answer it.
All of those screening decisions are called matters of "law." The common
criticism of the fact-law distinction-that the terms "fact" and "law" are nothing
more than labels to describe a normative conclusion that the jury or the judge is
best suited to decide a question--has greatest force in this context. Screening
decisions involve questions of fact as well as questions of law. We assign them to
the judge because we believe the judge is best suited to answer them. We call
them matters of law because we have assigned them to the judge. That
terminology is unfortunate. Lumping all screening decisions under the "law"
heading creates confusion about the nature of the fact-law distinction. By
delineating the decisions the judge makes in her screening capacity and removing
them, the fact-law distinction becomes much less circular and confusing. With an
appropriate set of data to consider and an appropriate question before it, the judge
must determine whether a given question is one of fact or of law. My argument,
fleshed out in the next section, is that the decision about whether such a question
is one of law or of fact turns on the types of inferences required to answer the
question.
B. The Inferential Test for Questions of Fact
1. The Categories of Inference in the Adjudicative Context
Logicians have traditionally divided inference into two basic categories:
deductive and inductive. The paradigmatic form of deductive reasoning is the
categorical syllogism of the following type:
Socrates is a man;
All men are mortal;
Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
The distinguishing feature of the deductive syllogism is that its conclusion is
contained in its premises. That is, it does not require any conjectures about the
world beyond the information in the premises. 174 If it is true that Socrates is a
174 See STEPHEN F. BARKER, THE ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 17 (2d ed. 1974) ("The essential
feature of a deductive argument is that it establishes its conclusion absolutely
demonstratively. ... "). In defining deduction in this way, I am drawing on a set of
interconnected philosophical dichotomies: between necessary and contingent truths; between
analytic and synthetic judgments; and between a priori and empirical knowledge. See SYBIL
WOLFRAM, PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION 80 (1989); A.C. GRAYLING, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC 44-45 (1982); 1 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
105, 140-44 (Paul Edwards, ed. 1967). The concepts of necessary truth, analytic judgment, and
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man, and it is true that all men are mortal, then it necessarily follows that Socrates
is mortal.
Legal conclusions often take syllogistic form. For example:
Anyone who intentionally and unlawfully kills a
human being is guilty of murder;
A intentionally and unlawfully killed B;
Therefore, A is guilty of murder.
Once the decision maker knows that murder is defined as "the intentional and
unlawful killing of a human being" and knows that a particular defendant has
intentionally and unlawfully killed another, the conclusion that the defendant is
guilty of murder follows without any conjecture or speculation required. 175
In contrast to deductive inferences, inductive inferences involve conjectures
about unobserved events or conditions in the world. 176 Probabilistic, empirical
inference is the hallmark of induction. 177 Where deduction relies on syllogistic
reasoning from assumed general propositions, induction draws conjectural
conclusions from data observed in the world. 178 Thus, arguments such as "A
planned to kill B; therefore, A probably did kill B" are inductive because they
require speculation about the likelihood that a person who had an intent to kill
actually did kill.179
a priori knowledge share a defining characteristic: they do not depend on experience with or
confirmation from the world. Deductive inference shares this characteristic. While it does not
necessarily flow from a priori knowledge (deductive inferences often depend on empirically-
derived premises), it always consists of analytic judgments to necessary truths. It is contrasted
with inductive inference, which produces contingent truths (one hopes) through synthetic
judgments based on empirical knowledge.
175 See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 42-43 (1990) (giving
examples of syllogistic legal reasoning).
17 6 See BARKER, supra note 174, at 17 ("[T]he conclusion [of an inductive argument]
makes some prediction or expresses some conjecture which goes beyond what the premises say
but about which we can find out by further observations.").
177 See MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 278-79 (1934) (defining induction in probabilistic terms).
178 See BARKER, supra note 174, at 17 ("The essential feature of a deductive argument is
that it establishes its conclusion absolutely demonstratively .... [T]he conclusion [of an
inductive argument] makes some prediction or expresses some conjecture which goes beyond
what the premises say but about which we can find out by further observations.").
179 See JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, THE PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOF 16 (1913). Some
logicians have considered this type of inference to be deductive because it depends on an
unstated major premise that in some sense "contains" the probabilistic conclusion. Charles
Sanders Peirce referred to this type of inference as probable deduction, formalized as follows:
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At least for purposes of adjudication, inductive reasoning may be used to
reach conclusions of three basic types: that an event or condition in the past or
present probably has occurred or is occurring; that an event or condition in the
future probably will occur; or that a hypothetical event or condition probably
would occur given some postulated set of circumstances, a type of reasoning
known as the counterfactual conditional. 180 The phrase "events or conditions" in
these formulations is intended to encompass virtually all phenomena in the world,
including the identity of things or persons, the occurrence of physical events or
human acts, mental states, and relations of cause and effect. 181
Of these types, the first, regarding actual historical events or conditions, is the
most prevalent in adjudication. Virtually all of the "who, what, when, and where"
questions in litigation call for this type of inference. In the case of "direct"
evidence, the inference relates to the credibility of a witness; it entails a decision
as to whether the witness perceived the described event, remembered it, and
accurately related it.182 The decision maker listens to the witnesses, decides
which to believe, and then draws conjectural conclusions about the world based
on the testimony. "Circumstantial" evidence requires both an inference as to
credibility and a further inference to matters beyond the information contained in
The proportion p of the Ms are P's;
S is an M,
It follows, with probability p, that S is a P.
CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE 191 (Justus Buchler ed.,
1955). Wigmore recognized that the inference could be formulated this way, but argued that it
is best considered inductive because it depends for its probative force on a major premise that is
derived inductively. WIGMORE, supra note 179, at 17. See also George F. James, Relevancy,
Probability and the Law, 29 CAL. L. REv. 689 (1941) (criticizing Wigmore for downplaying
significance of unstated major premise). But the same claim could be made about the major
premise of most syllogisms. A better reason for considering this type of inference inductive in
the context of adjudication is that the jury is not entitled to stop at the probabilistic conclusion
that "A probably carried out his design." To find A guilty, the jury must reach an absolute
conclusion (based on the applicable standard of proof) that A in fact carried out his design and
killed B. To the extent the jurors draw such a conclusion they are exceeding the information
contained in the premises, so their inference is best considered inductive.
180 See Roderick M. Chisholm, The Contrary-to-Fact-Conditional, in LOGIC AS
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTORY ANTHOLOGY 118, 118 (Peter T. Manicas ed., 1971) ("We
seem to have knowledge of what might have happened, of what would happen if certain
conditions were realized, of what tendencies, faculties, or potentialities an object could manifest
in suitable environments.").
181 See WIGMORE, supra note 179, at 3-4 (categorizing probanda sought to be proved at
trial).
182 See LILLY, supra note 143, at 49 ("When direct evidence of a consequential
proposition is presented.., the trier is concerned solely with whether to believe the witness.").
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the witness's testimony. 183 For example, assume that in a slip-and-fall case, to
show that the floor of a store was wet at the time of the accident, the plaintiff calls
a witness who saw a store customer spill water on the floor just before the
plaintiff's fall. To reach the desired conclusion, the decision maker must make a
probabilistic inference first that the spill occurred as the witness described it and
then that the spilled water was still on the floor when the plaintiff fell.
The second type of inductive inference, involving predictive inferences about
future events or conditions, arises most often in the remedies context. For
example, in deciding whether to issue an injunction, a decision maker must
decide whether the actions of the defendant will cause irreparable harm if allowed
to continue. Personal injury actions often involve determinations of future lost
earnings as well as future pain and suffering. Breach of contract actions may
involve determinations of future lost profits. All these matters require
probabilistic conjectures about events in the future.
The third type, regarding hypothetical events or conditions, is the central
consideration in questions of causation. Causation is a notoriously difficult
philosophical concept.184 The best treatment of causation as a legal matter is
H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honord's Causation in the Law.185 Hart and Honor6 define
causation in terms of expected courses of events. They describe the two aspects of
tort causation, "but-for" cause and "proximate" or "legal" cause, as follows:
The necessity of the cause for the production of the consequence means that, in
making causal statements, we must consult our knowledge of the general course
of events. Under what sorts of conditions do things of this sort happen? Does this
kind of thing happen without that kind of thing? The second aspect [proximate or
legal cause] forces us to consider less definite issues and very often matters of
degree. Although principles distinguishing between causes and mere conditions,
or between factors which 'break the chain' of causation and those which do not,
are to be found in ordinary thought apart from the law, their application often
raises disputable questions of classification: Was this a coincidence? How likely
was it? ... In these questions the issue is not so much: 'Did X happen?' but
rather 'Is what happened sufficiently like the standard case of an X to be
classified with it for legal purposes?" 86
Determining whether event A is the but-for cause of event B, then, requires
postulating a likely course of events and asking whether event B would be likely
183 See LILLY, supra note 143, at 49 ("[W]hen circumstantial evidence is introduced...
the trier not only must be concerned with whether to believe the witness, but also with whether
the evidence increases the probability of the proposition to which it is directed .... ").
184 See Co-iEN & NAGEL, supra note 177, at 245 ("The analysis of the meaning of
'causality' is a most difficult task.").
185 H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORt, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2nd ed. 1985).
186 Id. at 111.
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to occur in the absence of event A. Determining whether event A is the proximate
or legal cause of event B requires similar but more nuanced considerations. The
decision maker must decide whether event A is sufficiently extraordinary given
the expected course of events to be designated a "cause" rather than a "condition"
of event B for purposes of assigning fault.' 87 In their focus on the likely course of
events, both questions of but-for cause and questions of proximate cause require
probabilistic inferences about hypothetical conditions in the world-the events
that were most likely to happen given the state of the world prior to the injury.
The common ingredient in these different varieties of induction is their
incorporation of inferences that exceed the decision maker's existing body of
knowledge. Deductive inferences reclassify or recharacterize data based on
knowledge the decision maker already has. Inductive inferences lead to
conjectural conclusions about the world, and hence to new knowledge. Keeping
this distinction in mind is the key to understanding the fact-law distinction.
2. Applying Inferential Criteria to the Fact-Law Distinction
Dean Wigmore, the first scholar to probe the nature of judicial proof from a
philosophical perspective, was also the first to explicitly link adjudicative fact-
finding with inductive reasoning. Writing during the reign of "analytical
jurisprudence," under which it was supposed that judges could discern and apply
rules of law deductively, from a priori principles,188 Wigmore saw that the
determination of facts at trial requires probabilistic inference based on observation
and experiment.189 1 propose to turn that idea around and suggest that inductive
reasoning defines fact-finding. That is, to find a fact means no more than to use
inductive, probabilistic reasoning--to draw inferences that exceed the decision
maker's knowledge based on observed data.
But that does not end the matter. Influential philosophers have argued that all,
or nearly all, meaningful reasoning is inductive.190 And Holmes' admonition that
187 One way this question comes up is in the doctrine of superseding causes. Where an
actor engages in negligent conduct that is the but-for cause of an injury, the actor is not liable if
a superseding cause is present. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 451 (1965). The
Restatement gives as an example of a superseding cause an "[e]xlraordinary [f]orce of [n]ature
[i]ntervening to [b]ring [a]bout [h]arm [d]ifferent [flrom [tihat [t]hreatened by [the] [a]ctor's
[n]egligence." Determining whether an extraordinary force of nature will operate as a
superseding cause thus requires, among other things, determining whether the harm it caused is
different from the harm that would have been caused by the actor's negligence alone. The
decision maker must answer the question, "What harm would the actor's negligence have
caused if the force of nature had not intervened'?"
188 See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 605, 609 (1908)
(describing and attacking formalist approaches to jurisprudence).
189 WIGMORE, supra note 179, at 16.
190 See GRAYLING, supra note 174, at 48 (describing positivism).
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the life of the law has been experience rather than logic' 91 was meant to show that
legal rules are themselves derived inductively. 192 Thus, it will not do to suggest
that all inductive, probabilistic reasoning constitutes fact-finding in the sense
connoted by the fact-law distinction. The field of inquiry must be limited to the
real world dispute at the center of the litigation.' 93 This limitation leads to the
following definition of "question of fact:" A question offact is one that requires
for its answer inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in
dispute.194
That formulation risks circularity, but, with some defining of terms, it does
withstand scrutiny. Again, the role of the parties is key. In litigation, the plaintiff
must always assert that some event or condition-defined broadly as above' 95-
occurred out in the real world and that that event or condition impacted the
plaintiff or will impact the plaintiff in a negative way. The plaintiff thus sets the
terms of the debate by identifying something that happened (or in some cases,
will happen) causing an injury that the plaintiff claims is remediable in a court of
law. The defendant also plays a role in delineating the events or conditions
underlying the claims. The defendant may contest whether an event or condition
occurred the way the plaintiff says it did and whether its impact on the plaintiff is
as the plaintiff says it is. In addition, the defendant may assert that the plaintiffs
story is incomplete-that other events or conditions occurred that have a logical
191 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881) ("The life of the law has
not been logic: it has been experience.").
192 See id. ("The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories,
intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules
by which men should be governed.").
193 The failure to define the fact-finding function based on the transactions or
occurrences in dispute has created problems for previous efforts to distinguish "fact"
from "law." See Richard D. Friedman, Standards of Persuasion and the Distinction
Between Fact and Law, 86 Nw. U.L. REV. 916, 918 (1992). Professor Friedman states:
"The fact-finding function is to determine that part of reality that is relevant to the
adjudication of the action. We might think of this function as the reconstruction in
imagination of that portion of reality, as if making a mental film." Id. Professor Friedman
continues: "The law-determining function, then, is to prescribe the consequences to be
attached to that aspect of reality." Id. The problem with this definition is that matters such
as the congressional intent motivating a statute are clearly "part of reality that is relevant
to the adjudication of the action." Id. Yet, every judge would conclude that, that is an
issue of law.
194 1 use the phrase transactions or occurrences in the sense it has in the law relating to
resjudicata and compulsory counterclaims. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24
(1982) (defining "claims" in terms of transactions or series of transactions); FED. R. Civ. P.
13(a) (defining compulsory counterclaims in terms of transactions or occurrences).
195 "Events or conditions" encompasses virtually all phenomena in the world, real or
hypothetical, including the identity of things or persons, the occurrence of physical events or
human acts, mental states, and relations of cause and effect.
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connection to those posited by the plaintiff and that are necessary for a full
understanding of the events or conditions described by the plaintiff. The
"transactions or occurrences in dispute" are simply the events or conditions that
the plaintiff has pointed to as causing his injury, plus the injury itself, plus
logically connected events or conditions identified by the defendant.
As courts struggling to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion can attest,
precisely delineating the transactions or occurrences in dispute can be difficult.
But some guidelines exist. The transactions or occurrences in dispute always have
a more or less direct logical connection to the parties. They include the conduct,
condition, and mental states of the parties themselves, plus any other events or
conditions, including conduct and mental states of other people, having a causal,
spatial, or temporal connection to the conduct, condition, and mental states of the
parties. Where a question calls for inductive inferences about these sorts of events
or conditions, it requires inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute and so constitutes a question of fact.
Note what is excluded by this definition. The definition excludes, among
other things, questions calling for inferences about the conduct and mental states
of legislators or others in constructing standards or rules of law that are ultimately
determined to have a bearing on the resolution of the dispute. 196 Questions posed
in litigation may call for inductive inferences about these matters, and such
inferences may be crucial to the resolution of the dispute. But the parties will
almost never assert that the conduct and mental states of legislators or others
constitute the real-world events underlying their claims and defenses. In other
words, plaintiffs very rarely argue that conduct undertaken by a legislative or
judicial actor has caused the plaintiff an injury remediable in a court of law.
Occasionally plaintiffs have attempted to tie their alleged injuries to such
legislative action, and the result has usually been a determination that the plaintiff
lacks standing-or in other words, that the plaintiff's proposed question is
inappropriate. 197
Another major category of inference excluded from the definition is the set of
inferences about the consequences of the litigation itself, such as the effects on the
parties or others of a verdict or award. Again, at various points in the litigation
certain actors may consider the consequences of the litigation in deciding how to
196 The distinction I draw here is roughly equivalent to the one between adjudicative and
legislative facts. See FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other
hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process,
whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the
enactment of a legislative body.
Id.
197 See supra notes 156-173 and accompanying text (describing judge's role in deciding
whether question posed by parties is appropriate).
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resolve the dispute. But the consequences of the litigation cannot be the events the
plaintiff points to as a basis for seeking a remedy in a court of law.
Defining questions of fact in terms of inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute leaves several important classes of
questions of law. The category "question of law" includes, in addition to the
screening questions described in the previous section, all "appropriate" questions
calling for deductive inferences-regardless of their subject-and all
"appropriate" questions calling for inductive inferences about matters outside the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. Whenever a question requires the decision
maker to label or characterize known real-world phenomena by reference to the
decision maker's pre-existing store of knowledge, it involves deductive
inferences. And even if it requires the decision maker to draw conjectural
inferences exceeding the decision maker's pre-existing store of knowledge, so
that it calls for inductive inferences, it does not involve a question of fact if the
inferences relate to matters such as the intentions or purposes of a legislature or
the likely actions of other people who are made aware of the outcome of the
litigation.
To summarize, whenever a decision maker has a set of data about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute in mind and is asked to draw further
conjectural inferences about logically related real-world phenomena, a question of
fact has been presented. On the other hand, whenever a decision maker has a set
of data about the world in mind and is asked to make a judgment about that data
by reference to 1) the decision maker's own notions of fairness or justice, 2) the
likely preferences of legislators or others in the past who might have anticipated
similar circumstances, or 3) the likely future reactions of people to a decision one
way or another, a question of law has been presented.
3. Demonstrating the Validity of the Inferential Account
The descriptive aspect of my argument entails a claim that, in practice, judges
label questions as "fact" or "law" depending on the inferences involved, whether
they realize it or not. To demonstrate that point-and to show the utility of my
theory-I need to show the fact-law distinction at work in common-law
situations. I do that in this section in two ways. First, I examine a single case in
which the fact-law distinction played a central role to show how judges label
questions as factual or legal depending on the inferences involved. Then, to show
the validity of my approach more generally, I apply my approach to the issue of
reasonableness, a doctrine that scholars have targeted as defying explanation
under the fact-law distinction.
The California Supreme Court's decision in Loper v. Morrison'9" provides a
good starting point for demonstrating the inferential underpinnings of the fact-law
198 145 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1944).
1160 [Vol. 64:1125
THE RIGHT TO A JURY DECISION
distinction. In Loper, an employee of a milk company attempted to collect a
delinquent account at the home of a customer.199 Finding the customer not at
home, he went with another employee to a tavern to await the customer's
return. 200 After leaving the tavern, he drove his fellow employee home, and then
started back toward the customer's house.20 1 While on the way, and while still
outside his delivery area, he collided with the plaintiff's car, injuring the
plaintiff.20 2 The plaintiff brought suit against both the employee, for his
negligence, and the employer, based on respondeat superior. The trial judge
submitted the case to a jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff.203
The defendant employer appealed, arguing that the case against it should not
have gone to the jury because the judge should have decided as a matter of law
that the employee was not acting within the scope of his employment. Justice
Traynor, writing in dissent, agreed. After stating that the extent of liability is a
matter of law where the facts are undisputed, he argued that "[i]n the present case
the court can determine better than the jury the extent of the vicarious liability to
which the Arden Milk Company should be subject. '204 He then noted:
[t]he undisputed evidence shows that it was no part of Morrison's duty to take
Dolan home, and that he did so merely as a personal favor. The accident
occurred on the way back from Dolan's home, some twenty blocks from the
nearest point of Morrison's assigned territory. It is my opinion that Morrison was
returning from a personal mission and had not resumed his employment at the
time of the accident and was therefore not then acting within the scope of his
employment. 205
Traynor saw the question of whether the employee was acting in the scope of
his employment as a normative matter. He looked at the apparent circumstances
of the accident and asked whether the employer should be held liable. That was a
question he could answer without drawing any further inferences about the events
or conditions in question. He had only to evaluate the set of "undisputed" data
against his own pre-existing notions of fairness, plus his knowledge of how other
judges had treated similar situations and his speculations about the effect of a
liability ruling on similarly situated actors in the future. For Traynor, therefore,
the scope-of-employment question did not require inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. It was a question of law.
199 Loper v. Morrison, 145 P.2d 1, 2 (Cal. 1944).
200 Id.201 Id.
202 Id. at 2-3.
203 See Loper v. Morrison, 134 P.2d 311, 313-14 (Cal. App. 1943).
204 Loper, 145 P.2d at 7 (Traynor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
205 Id.
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The majority took a very different approach. The majority saw the scope-of-
employment question as turning on the states of mind of both the employee and
the employer. The majority stated:
[Tihe factors to be considered... are the intent of the employee, the nature, time,
and place of his conduct, his actual and implied authority, the work he was hired
to do, the incidental acts that the employer should reasonably have expected
would be done, and the amount of freedom allowed the employee in performing
his duties.206
That question could not be answered based solely on the apparent circumstances
of the accident. The decision maker had to make additional inductive inferences,
drawn from the known circumstances, about the employee's intent and the
employer's expectations. While the majority recognized that in some cases the
evidence would permit only one conclusion on those questions, so that the judge
could decide the question as a matter of law, in this case multiple inferences were
possible. Hence, a jury decision was required.207
The real dispute in Loper was over the appropriate question to be posed. In
the defendant's view, liability should have turned on the question, "Should an
employer be liable for the negligence of his employee where the employee injures
someone after taking a detour from his job-related activities for personal reasons
and before returning to his designated delivery area?" In the plaintiff's view, that
was not an appropriate question. Instead, the plaintiff argued, implicitly, that the
employer should be liable unless the employee intended to abandon his job-
related activities and the employer had no reason to believe the employee would
take the detour. Thus, for the plaintiff the dispositive question was "Did this
employee intend to abandon his job-related activities and did the employer have
reason to believe the employee would take a detour such as this while engaged in
his job-related activities?" Again, the judge always has the exclusive authority to
decide which questions should be asked. Once a majority of the appellate court
determined that the plaintiff's question was the appropriate one, it had to decide
whether the judge or jury should answer it. Because the plaintiff's question called
for inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute, it was a
question of fact that had to go to the jury. The majority so held.
Other sorts of questions also call for inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute, and these are not always as apparent. The
concept of reasonableness provides a good example. Although the question of
whether conduct was reasonable is typically assigned to the jury,20 8 courts and
20 6 Id. at 3-4.
20 7 Id. at 4.
208 See, e.g., Louisville, E. & S.L.C.R. Co. v. Berry, 36 N.E. 646, 650 (id. App. 1894)
("Within the whole range of judicial inquiry, there are but few questions that are more
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commentators have hesitated to call it a question of fact, usually referring to it as a
mixed question of law and fact.209 In one of the few articles of the last fifty years
to treat the fact-law distinction in any detail, Professor Stephen Weiner focused
on the criterion of reasonableness to show what he saw as the "inconsistency and
confusion" inherent in the use of the fact-law terminology. 210
Indeed, courts have often seemed uncertain in labeling reasonableness, and
with some justification. Reasonableness does involve both legal and factual
characteristics. But distinguishing those elements is easier than it has appeared to
be. In some legal contexts, the factual elements predominate; in others, the legal
elements predominate. Once the relative weight is understood, it becomes clear
that judges allocate decisions on the question of reasonableness in fairly
consistent ways, explainable by reference to inferential criteria.
The most obvious and important use of the reasonableness standard is in the
law of negligence. The Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the standard of
conduct required to avoid being negligent as "that of a reasonable man under like
circumstances." 211 It then further defines the standard of the reasonable man by
stating that "[n]egligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by
the community for the protection of others against unreasonable risk."'212 In other
words, the reasonable man behaves according to community standards for the
protection of others against unreasonable risks. Finally, the Restatement defines
unreasonableness:
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk
of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is
peculiarly and exclusively within the province of the jury than those of negligence and the want
of contributory negligence.").
2 0 9 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 355 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). Hart and Sacks elided the problem by calling
reasonableness a "standard"-something halfway between law and fact. Id. Others have also
taken this approach. See, e.g, POSNER, supra note 175, at 44. Early on, Thayer pointed out the
inefficacy of the label "mixed question of law and fact." See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 224-25 (1898).
All questions of fact, for a jury or for a court, are mixed questions of law and fact; for they
must be decided with reference to all relevant rules of law; and whether there be any such
rule, and what it is, must be determined by the court. Now since this mixture of law and
fact is thus common to a variety of different situations, it is an uninstructive circumstance
to lean upon when one seeks for guidance in discriminating these situations.
Id.
210 See Weiner, supra note 134, at 1876.
211 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) ("Unless the actor is a child, the
standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable
man under like circumstances.").
2 12 Id. § 283 cmt. c.
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of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or
of the particular manner in which it is done. 2 13
This is simply another way of saying that reasonableness depends on the
circumstances. 2 14 People might be justified in taking certain risks if taking those
risks is the only way to avoid worse consequences. 215 The factors to be
considered in determining the utility of the actor's conduct include "the extent of
the chance that [an important] interest will be advanced or protected by the
particular course of conduct" and "the extent of the chance that such interest can
be adequately advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of
conduct., 2 16
The weighing of risk and utility prescribed in the definition of
unreasonableness calls for counterfactual probabilistic inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. In requiring an inference as to whether
other courses of conduct that the actor might have taken would have produced the
same benefits at less cost, the question of reasonableness requires the decision
maker to speculate about how events might have unfolded if circumstances had
been different. If other actions that could have been taken would not have
213 Id. § 291; see also United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947) (postulating that conduct is negligent when the cost or burden of preventing the injury is
less than the product of the probability of the injury and the loss resulting from the injury
(B<PL)). The Tentative Draft of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts even more explicitly
incorporates risk-benefit balancing in the definition of negligence:
A person acts with negligence if the person does not exercise reasonable care under
all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether the person's
conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that it will result in harm, the
foreseeable severity of the harm that may ensue, and the burden that would be bome by the
person and others if the person takes precautions that eliminate or reduce the possibility of
harm.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 (Tentative Draft No. 1,
2001). For a critique of the Tentative Draft's treatment of risk-benefit balancing, see Stephen G.
Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person
Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REv. 813 (2001).
2 14 See Prunty v. Doylestown Florabunda, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10349, *9 (E.D. Pa.
July 14, 1998) (instructing jury that "[o]rdinary care is a relative term, not an absolute one. That
is to say, in deciding whether ordinary care was exercised in a given case, the conduct in
question must be viewed in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, as shown by the
evidence of the case.").
215 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 cmt. e (1965). The Restatement gives as an
example a case in which "the legal rate of speed is exceeded in the pursuit of a felon or in
conveying a desperately wounded patient to a hospital."
2 16 Id. § 292. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM
§ 3 cmt. e (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("Conduct is negligent if its disadvantages outweigh its
advantages, while conduct is not negligent if its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.").
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produced the same benefit at less cost, the actor's conduct was not unreasonable.
Because this conclusion turns on hypothetical, probabilistic inferences about the
actor's conduct-an essential component of the transaction or occurrence in
dispute--it is a question of fact.
In some cases an allegedly negligent act is a bare omission-the actor had no
benevolent purpose in mind-so that the utility of the conduct is nil or virtually
nil. But even in such a case the decision maker must draw counterfactual
probabilistic inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. In every
case, for conduct to be unreasonable, the actor must have been able to recognize
the risk.217 To decide whether an actor reasonably should have recognized the
risk, the decision maker must recreate the events as they appeared to the
defendant and then spin out hypothetical scenarios for how events would most
probably unfold. The actor's conduct is unreasonable only if the series of events
leading to the injury has some significant probability in comparison with other
possible outcomes. 218 Injuries that are flukes-that are not expected because
other non-injurious courses of events are much more probable under the
circumstances-are not the product of negligence. 219 Thus, every reasonableness
determination involves hypothetical, probabilistic judgments about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute.
What makes the reasonableness question difficult to characterize is its
invocation of community standards. The decision maker must compare the actor's
conduct against the community standards for behavior under similar
circumstances. Even if the probability of an injury was low and/or the relative
utility of the conduct was high, an actor might be negligent if he failed to act in
ways that community standards dictate for the situation. "If the actor does what
others do, under like circumstances, there is at least a possible inference that he is
conforming to the community standard of reasonable conduct; and if he does not
do what others do there is a possible inference that he is not so conforming. '220
Thus, a decision maker must answer the question, "What would a person of
217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 289 (1965) ("The actor is required to
recognize that his conduct involves a risk of causing an invasion of another's interest .... ).
2 18 See McFarlin v. Hall, 619 P.2d 729, 734 (Ariz. 1980) ("The test of whether the duty of
reasonable care is discharged is the probability or possibility of injury to the plaintiff.").
2 19 See McChargue v. Black Grading Contractors, Inc., 176 S.E.2d 212, 216 (Ga. Ct. App.
1970).
[T]he law requires a person to anticipate or foresee and guard against what usually
happens and is likely to happen, but the law does not require a person to anticipate or
foresee and provide against that which is unusual and not likely to happen, or, in other
words, that which is only remotely and slightly probable. The general test in such cases is
not whether the injurious result or consequence is possible, but whether it was probable,
that is likely to occur according to the usual experience of persons.
Id.
220 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (1965).
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ordinary prudence in this community do under these circumstances? ' 221
Assuming the circumstances leading to the injury have been established-by
assumption, agreement, or prior determination-answering that question does not
involve factual inferences. Instead of drawing inductive inferences about the
specific people and events involved in the matter, the decision maker must draw
inductive inferences about how other people from the community would behave
under similar circumstances. And almost inevitably, the decision maker's own
preconceived notions about how people in the community should behave will
creep into that analysis. Thus, determining the community standards involves
inductive inferences about matters beyond the transactions or occurrences in
dispute, as well as deductive inferences about those transactions or occurrences.
This inferential focus suggests that the determination of community standards
is really a question of law.222 Nevertheless, the question normally goes to the
jury. Typically, the rationale for this choice is that juries are at least as well
acquainted-if not better acquainted-with community standards for
reasonableness than the judge. In Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout,223 the Supreme
Court summed this rationale up as follows:
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and
men of little education, men of leaming and men whose leaming consists only in
what they have themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the
farmer, the laborer; these sit together, consult, apply their separate experience of
the affairs of life to the facts proven, and draw a unanimous conclusion.... It is
assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of life than does one
221 See Prather v. Brandt, 981 S.W.2d 801, 810 (Tex. App. 1998). The court approved the
following jury instructions:
"Negligence" means failure to use ordinary care, that is, failing to do that which a person
of ordinary prudence would have done under the same or similar circumstances or doing
that which a person of ordinary prudence would not have done under the same or similar
circumstances.
"Ordinary care" means that degree of care that would be used by a person of ordinary
prudence under the same or similar circumstances.
Id
222 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.
REv. 443, 457 (1899) ("[E]very time that a judge declines to rule whether certain conduct is
negligent or not he avows his inability to state the law . .
223 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
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man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted facts thus
occurring than can a single judge. 224
Whether or not the determination of community standards is a question of "law,"
then, courts have the sense that the jury is often more competent than the judge to
make that determination. 22 5 That is not a problem for my Seventh Amendment
analysis. While it would be inappropriate to assign "preliminary" law questions,
such as the admissibility of evidence, to the jury, it is not inappropriate to assign
this type of law question to the jury. Juries answer such law questions whenever
they give general verdicts. Because it does not include a right to a non-jury
trial,226 the Seventh Amendment poses no bar.
I spend some time discussing this aspect of reasonableness because
understanding the interplay of the standard of conduct and the determination of
negligence is critical to understanding the fact-law distinction. Professor Weiner
recognized that determining the standard of conduct is not really a question of
fact. But he then made an unwarranted jump: seeing that the determination of the
governing standard is not really a fact question, he criticized courts for calling the
224 Sioux City & Pac. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). See also
Louisville, E. & S.L.C.R. Co. v. Berry, 36 N.E. 646, 650 (Ind. App. 1894). The Indiana Court
of Appeals explained:
The jurors, in their callings and experiences, have usually come in contact with, and
observed, the conduct of men under varied conditions. It is this diversity which gives value
to their unanimous judgment. Collectively, they are more capable of determining how an
ordinarily prudent man would act under given conditions than judges of courts, whose
experiences are usually confined to one calling, and who are proverbially prone to
generalize and follow precedents.
Id 225 Jurors do not always determine the governing standard. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 285 (1965) (providing that applicable standards of conduct may be provided by
legislation or judicial decision). Judges have often prescribed standards of conduct, particularly
in recurring situations such as railroad accidents. Id. § 285 cmt. e. Such judicial intervention is
appropriate given that the determination of a governing standard does not involve inductive
inferences about the particular actors and events in dispute, and is often largely a policy-based,
normative judgment.
226 See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959) ("[N]o
[constitutional] requirement protects trials by the court.... ."). See generally Note, The Right to
a Nonjury Trial, 74 HARV. L. REv. 1176 (1961). A litigant might have an argument under the
due process clause that preliminary questions traditionally recognized as raising legal issues
must be answered by the judge. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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application of the standard to established conduct a fact question. 227 The
Tentative Draft of the new Restatement (Third) of Torts seems to make the same
jump by concluding, with little explanation, that the determination of negligence
is a question of law.228
Again, there is some validity to this understanding. Once the decision maker
has both the community standards and the circumstances leading to the injury in
mind, comparing the two requires a simple deductive inference: the actor's
conduct either does or does not fit the applicable standards. In at least some cases,
then, the question of whether conduct is unreasonable is one of law. The
Restatement (Second) recognizes this point, stating that "where there is nothing in
the situation or in common experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this
inference may be so strong as to call for a directed verdict ... -229
But the Restatement makes clear that the application of community standards
alone will seldom establish negligence; the decision maker must consider the
probability of the risk in each individual case. "Any such custom is... not
necessarily conclusive as to whether the actor, by conforming to it, has exercised
the care of a reasonable man under the circumstances, or by departing from it has
failed to exercise such care." 230 Thus, inductive inferences about the transactions
227 See Weiner, supra note 134, at 1881. Weiner stated that:
It is submitted that a most significant feature of [Stout] is its refusal to say that the
issue should be submitted to the jury because it is one of fact, or conversely that the issue is
one of fact because it should be submitted to the jury. Instead, the Court simply concluded
that the jury was better qualified than the judge to apply the standard of "proper care" to
the undisputed facts.
Id
2 2 8 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 8 cmt. b
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001). The Tentative Draft provides:
In light of the facts relating to the actor's conduct, the question arises whether that
conduct is negligent: whether it lacks reasonable care under all the circumstances. Because
this is a matter of the laWs evaluation of the legal significance of the actor's conduct, such
a question could be characterized as a question of law that should be decided by the court.
More precisely, it can be characterized as a mixed question of law and fact.
Id.
229 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b (1965). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001)
("In some cases a custom is such that it induces general reliance by virtually all those
participating in an activity; to this extent, custom establishes the standard by which those
engaging the activity assume they are bound.").
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. c (1965). See also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 13(a) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2001) ("An
actor's compliance with the custom of the community, or of others in like circumstances, is
evidence that the actor's conduct is not negligent but does not preclude a finding of
negligence.").
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or occurrences in dispute are always presumptively a part of the reasonableness
analysis, although there might be cases in which reasonable people could reach
only one conclusion. While the determination of the governing standard may be a
question of law (albeit one that typically goes to the jury), the determination that
conduct was or was not reasonable is a question of fact.
In other legal contexts, reasonableness is not imbued with the factual
characteristics that it has in the law of negligence. As an example of the confusion
surrounding the concept of reasonableness, Professor Weiner pointed to the
treatment of reasonableness in the doctrine of malicious prosecution.231 To be
liable for malicious prosecution, a person must have initiated criminal
proceedings against an innocent person "without probable cause." 232 Probable
cause exists if the accuser "reasonably believes" that the accused has committed a
crime. As Professor Weiner pointed out, courts that give the question of
reasonableness to the jury in a negligence case typically reserve for themselves
the question of whether a malicious prosecution defendant had a reasonable belief
in the guilt of the accused.233
That apparent discrepancy makes sense when seen as an application of the
inferential account of the fact-law distinction. Determining reasonableness in a
negligence case entails making hypothetical, probabilistic inferences about the
nature of the defendant's conduct. But determining whether a person had a
reasonable belief in the guilt of another requires no inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute, once the circumstances as they appeared
have been established by assumption, agreement, or prior determination.
According to Prosser, "[p]robable cause is judged by appearances to the
defendant at the time he initiates prosecution .... The appearances must be such
as to lead a reasonable person to set the criminal process in motion."234 The
defendant's subjective belief is irrelevant, 235 and whether the accused actually
committed the crime is also irrelevant.236 All that matters is that a reasonable
person would conclude-based solely on appearances at the time-that a crime
had been committed. A decision maker tasked with making that decision needs
nothing but his own sense of how to characterize events in the world. The
231 See Weiner, supra note 134, at 1910-12. Thayer also used the malicious prosecution
example to demonstrate the confusion surrounding the fact-law distinction. See THAYER, supra
note 209, at 252.
232 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 653 (1965).
233 See id. § 673 (1) (1965) ("In an action for malicious prosecution the court determines
whether... (c) the defendant had probable cause for initiating and continuing the
proceedings ....").
2 34 PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 876 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984).
2 3 5 Id. at 877.
236 Id. at 876. That the defendant was in fact guilty is the basis for a separate defense to
the charge of malicious prosecution.
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decision maker simply compares the apparent conduct of the accused with the
decision maker's storehouse of knowledge about what constitutes apparent
criminal conduct. The decision maker does not draw any conclusions about
whether a crime actually was committed. No hypothetical inferences about how
events would play out, nor any other inductive inferences about the circumstances
at issue, are required.
Reasonableness, in this context, is a matter of law. And courts have
consistently treated it as such. In fact, this is one of the rare instances in which
good evidence for English common-law practice is available. In a noted case,
Lords Mansfield and Loughborough declared that "[t]he question of probable
cause is a mixed proposition of law and fact. Whether the circumstances alleged
to shew it probable, or not probable, are true and existed, is a matter of fact; but
whether, supposing them true, they amount to a probable cause, is a question of
law .... ,,237 The Lords thus parsed the factual and legal elements exactly as I
suggest. Determining the circumstances as they appeared to the defendant is a
question of fact; determining whether a reasonable person looking at those
circumstances would conclude that a crime has been committed is a question of
law.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S SEVENTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE:
A CRITIQUE
The Supreme Court's recent Seventh Amendment decisions offer both a
window on the Court's thinking about questions of decisional responsibility and a
forum for testing the inferential account. The cases provide an opportunity to
show how importing an inferential conception of the fact-law distinction into the
Seventh Amendment can help resolve real problems in allocating decisional
responsibility between judge and jury. I treat the cases in pairs. Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc.238 and City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.,239
which I cover first, both involve liability determinations and in both cases the
Court advocated an approach to the allocation of decisional responsibility turning
on "functional considerations." Tull v. United States240 and Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc.,241 the second pair, both involve remedies questions
arising under federal statutes, and in both cases the Court struggled with how to
apply the Seventh Amendment to remedies issues. My analysis of these cases
demonstrates my basic point: although they may not be able to express why,
237 Johnstone v. Sutton, 99 Eng. Rep. 1225, 1243-44 (Ex. 1786), aft'd, 99 Eng. Rep. 1377
(H.L. 1787).
238 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
239 526 U.S. 687 (1999).
240 481 U.S. 412 (1987).
241 523 U.S. 340 (1998).
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judges see something distinctive about questions of "fact" and generally label
them appropriately. In my view, three of the four cases were decided correctly.
Not coincidentally, the one that I conclude was not decided correctly, Tull,
presents the most difficult issues.
A. Liability Questions and "Functional Considerations ": Markman and
Del Monte Dunes
The Supreme Court in Markman introduced an apparently novel
consideration into its Seventh Amendment jurisprudence by relying on
"functional considerations" to find that a judge may permissibly construe the
claims in a patent. The Court cited Miller v. Fenton242 for the proposition that the
fact-law distinction can be understood, at least in part, to incorporate such
functional considerations. The Court's analysis here is unsatisfying in several
ways. Miller v. Fenton did not address the allocation of responsibility between
judge and jury-the central question in Markman. Miller was a habeas corpus
case in which the convicted defendant claimed that his custodial confession
should have been suppressed as involuntary by the state trial court. The federal
district court dismissed the habeas petition and the Third Circuit affirmed,
holding that the voluntariness of the confession was a "factual issue" under 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d), which commands deference to state court findings-of-fact. 243
The Supreme Court reversed that decision. It concluded that voluntariness is
either a legal question or a mixed question of law and fact, and that in either case
it is subject to plenary federal review.244
Voluntariness is an aspect of the decision as to whether a particulardatum-
the confession-should be put before the ultimate decision maker. Decisions
about what data may be put before the decision maker are screening decisions that
are always considered questions of law.245 Miller is thus a case asking which
judge should decide what is indisputably a "judge" question. Although the answer
to that question is itself framed in terms of the distinction between factual and
legal determinations, it does not implicate the Seventh Amendment's right to a
jury trial. It is, rather, a matter of ordinary statutory interpretation. To the extent
242 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
243 Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 108 (1985). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982), amended
by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1996).
In any proceeding instituted in a Federal court by an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination
after a hearing on the merits of a factual issue, made by a State court of competent
jurisdiction... shall be presumed to be correct ....
Id.
244 Miller, 474 U.S. at 110-12.
245 See supra notes 143-48 and accompanying text.
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the question of whether a trial judge or appellate judge should decide a legal
question raises constitutional concerns, they involve the due process clause.246 In
that context, it is entirely appropriate to consider which judicial actor is better
suited to make the decision "as a matter of the sound administration ofjustice. ''247
Litigants in appropriate civil cases, on the other hand, have a constitutional
right to a jury trial of fact issues. The framers of the constitution performed a
"functional" analysis in 1791 and concluded that juries are better suited than
judges to decide questions of fact in actions at law. We are stuck with that choice
to the extent we can determine which questions are "factual." The Court in
Markman seemed to recognize that point; it simply perceived insurmountable
obstacles to identifying questions of fact. Ironically, though, the Markman Court's
own analysis of patent law and precedent dispels that notion and, in the process,
shows how an inferential understanding of the fact-law distinction may actually
undergird the decision.
The Patent Act requires a patent seeker to provide specifications for his
invention that "contain a written description of the invention.., in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art... to
make and use the same," and that "conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards
as his invention. '248 The Federal Circuit seized on this language in its decision in
Markman. It concluded that the statutory requirement that claim language be
clear, in conjunction with the oversight of the Patent Office, removed the
possibility of ambiguity in claim terms. As a result, the Federal Circuit treated
patent claims as quasi-public writings, the terms of which could not be varied by
the parties.249
This way of construing patents rests on an assumption that the scope of
the patent is exactly what the words of the patent describe. The question of
what the patent covers-in other words, claim construction-is nothing more
than a determination of the literal meaning of the words in the claims.
Answering that question requires no inductive inferences about the parties'
intentions or any other part of the transactions or occurrences in dispute. In
the court's words, "the focus in construing disputed terms in claim language
is not the subjective intent of the parties to the patent contract when they
used a particular term." 250 Instead, "the focus is on the objective test of what
246 See In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding
complexity exception to right tojury trial based on due process clause).
247 See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996) (quoting
Miller v. Fenton 474 U.S. 104, 114 (1985)).
248 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
249 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986-87 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en
banc).
250 Id at 986.
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one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
understood the term to mean." 251
Claim construction may require extrinsic evidence, but it is evidence of the
technical meaning of the terms as an objective matter:
Extrinsic evidence, therefore, may be necessary to inform the court about the
language in which the patent is written. But this evidence is not for the purpose
of clarifying ambiguity in claim terminology. It is not ambiguity in the document
that creates the need for extrinsic evidence but rather unfamiliarity of the court
with the terminology of the art to which the patent is addressed.252
This use of extrinsic evidence, in the Federal Circuit's view, is similar to a court's
reliance on legislative history in interpreting a statute.253 In both cases, the court
engages in inductive inference, but the inference is to how people not involved in
the dispute-legislators in one case, people "skilled in the art" in the other-
would understand the meaning of the words at issue.
With much less exegesis, the Supreme Court adopted a similar understanding
of patent interpretation. Its reasoning is best shown in its treatment of Bischoffv.
Wethered,254 on which Markman had relied. The plaintiff in Bischoff had
contracted for the assignment of a patent. He later determined that a prior patent
had been awarded for an identical invention. If that were true, the presence of the
prior patent would nullify the patent he purchased. He brought an action for
breach of contract, in which the central issue was whether the two inventions
were in fact identical.255 In other words, the case turned on whether an
infringement action would succeed if one were brought. The Supreme Court held
that all issues should go to the jury, including the construction of the potentially
infringing patent.256
The Court understood the construction of the patent to require the mental
recreation of the invention. The Court described the subject-matter of the
patent as "an embodied conception outside of the patent itself." 257 The Court
concluded that "[t]his outward embodiment of the terms contained in the
patent is the thing invented, and is to be properly sought, like the explanation
of all latent ambiguities arising from the description of external things, by
evidence in pais." 258 Thus, the Court saw the jury's role as mentally
251 Id
252 Id.
253 Id. at 987.
254 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812 (1869).
255 Id at 812.
256 Id. at 814-15.
257 Id. at 815.
258 Id. at 815.
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recreating the invented products based on the patents and the expert
testimony, and then comparing the "invention" described in the first patent to
the "invention" described in the second patent to decide whether they are the
same.
The Supreme Court in Markman rejected that approach to patent law. While
it recognized that a "novelty" action such as Bischoff might turn on the outward
embodiment of the patent, it maintained that a patent infringement action turns on
simple document interpretation: 259
Where technical terms are used, or where the qualities or substances or
operations mentioned of any similar data necessary to the comprehension of the
language of the patent are unknown to the judge, the testimony of witnesses may
be received upon these subjects, and any other means of information be
employed. But in the actual interpretation of the patent the court proceeds upon
its own responsibility, as an arbiter of the law, giving to the patent its true and
final character and force.260
Bischoff adopted an understanding of patent law that would require the
decision maker to draw inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences
in dispute (the outward embodiment of the patented product). In turn, the Bischoff
Court saw patent claim construction as a question of fact for the jury. Markman
rejected that understanding in favor of an approach focusing on the literal
meaning of the words contained in the patent. That approach requires no
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.
Accordingly-and rightly given its understanding of what claim construction
actually involves-the Markman Court saw patent claim construction as a
question of law for the judge.
In Del Monte Dunes, the Court relied heavily on language from Markman.
But the Del Monte Dunes Court effectively used the focus on the different
capabilities of judges and juries advocated in Markman to emphasize the jury's
primary role of deciding questions of fact. Again, Del Monte Dunes involved a
takings claim, in which the plaintiff had to establish either that "Del Monte Dunes
had been denied all economically viable use of its property or that the city's
decision to reject the plaintiff's 190 unit development proposal did not
substantially advance a legitimate public purpose."261
The Supreme Court, although citing Markman for its reliance on historical,
precedential, and functional considerations, engaged in a relatively subtle analysis
of the fact-law distinction. The Court concluded that the issues of whether the
plaintiff had been deprived of all economically viable use of his property and
259 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 386-87 (1996).
2 60 Id. at 388 (quoting 2 W. ROBINSON, LAW OF PATENTS § 732, at 481-83 (1890)).
261 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 700 (1999) (internal quotes
omitted).
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whether the regulation substantially advances legitimate public interests were
both fact questions requiring a jury decision.262 But the Court also noted that the
question of whether the statutory purposes were legitimate-leaving aside the
question of whether the regulation advanced those purposes-was arguably a
question of law suitable for determination by the judge.263
As usual in cases invoking the fact-law distinction, the Court's reasoning as
to why an issue is factual is left largely unstated. But, also as usual, the Court's
instincts are good. The question of whether all economically viable use of the
property has been eliminated clearly involves inductive inferences about the
transactions or occurrences in dispute. The decision maker looks at the property
subject to the restrictions and then makes probabilistic judgments about what
beneficial uses might be made of the property with the regulations in place. That
involves a hypothetical inference about the relationship between the two key
elements in the dispute-the property and the regulations. The question is one of
fact under my approach and so should go to the jury, just as the Court held.
The question of whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate
governmental interest is also factual. The decision maker was presented with a set
of governmental interests. It was then asked whether the regulations bore a
reasonable relationship to those objectives. To make that determination, the
decision maker had to draw probabilistic inferences about the effects of
prohibiting the landowner's desired uses of the property and substituting the uses
prescribed by the government. Again, that means drawing inductive inferences
about the transactions or occurrences in dispute (the nature of the property and the
effect of the regulations). The question must go to the jury, as the Court held.
The Court was also correct to suggest that determining what constitutes a
legitimate government interest is a question of law.264 Whether a regulatory
objective is legitimate depends solely on considerations of public policy. While
inductive inferences may be needed to draw policy-based conclusions, they are
not inferences about the transactions or occurrences that underlie the plaintiff's
claim. They involve normative judgments about the proper functions of
government in general. The need for such inferences is one of the hallmarks of a
question of law.
Despite their ostensible focus on functional considerations, then, both
Markman and Del Monte Dunes allocate decisional responsibility according to
the fact-law dichotomy and distinguish questions of fact from questions of law in
accordance with inferential criteria. They at least bolster my descriptive argument
about how courts understand and apply the fact-law distinction. On a normative
262 Id. at 721.
263 Id. at 722.
264 See id. This aspect of the opinion is dicta, and is phrased hypothetically. Del Monte
Dunes did not challenge the constitutionality of the city's regulatory objectives. The Court was
speculating about what might be the result if such a challenge were made.
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level, they may also be understood to require resort to inferential criteria in the
allocation of decisional responsibility under the Seventh Amendment.
B. The Remedies Problem: Tull and Feltner
The Court has struggled to fit remedies questions into the Seventh
Amendment framework. In Tull, the Court seemed to suggest that the Seventh
Amendment has no bearing on remedies decisions. But the Court reversed course
on that issue just a few years later, in Feltner. I will argue that Tull was wrongly
decided, and that remedies questions are subject to the same fact-law analysis as
liability questions, so that my approach removes this source of confusion.
In Tull, the Court considered whether the Seventh Amendment requires a jury
decision on the assessment of civil penalties under the Clean Water Act. The
Court concluded that the Seventh Amendment operates to preserve "[o]nly those
incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of
the system of trial by jury."265 In reasoning leaving much to be desired, the Court
then concluded that the assessment of civil penalties is not a fundamental element
of a jury trial because Congress has the power to fix the amounts of those
penalties statutorily.266 The Court did not frame this issue in terms of whether the
assessment of the civil penalty is a question of fact, perhaps out of a sense that
remedies questions simply fall outside the fact-law rubric. It discussed "the
assessment of the civil penalty" as an abstract matter, without focusing on what
sorts of judgments a decision maker must make to decide on a penalty amount.
The Court did, however, cite the factors to be considered in a footnote, and an
examination of those factors shows both that this is a close case and that the
majority probably got it wrong.
The Clean Water Act directs a court, in assessing civil penalties, to consider
"the seriousness of the violations, the economic benefits accrued from the
violations, prior violations, good-faith efforts to comply with the relevant
requirements, and the economic impact of the penalty. ' '267 Thus, answering the
265 Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 426 (1987).
266 Id.
267 Id. at 423 n.8. At the time the Court heard arguments in Tull, these factors were
enunciated only in the EPA's regulatory policy. Subsequently, the Clean Water Act was
amended to incorporate them directly. Id. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000). The amended Act
provides:
In determining the amount of a civil penalty the court shall consider the seriousness of the
violation or violations, the economic benefit (if any) resulting from the violation, any
history of such violations, any good-faith efforts to comply with the applicable
requirements, the economic impact of the penalty on the violator, and such other matters as
justice may require.
1176 [Vol. 64:1125
THE RIGHT TO A JURY DECISION
question, "What amount of civil penalties should be assessed?" requires
answering whether each of those factors is present. To the extent they call for
inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute, those factors
raise fact questions.
Assuming that there is only one set of data about the external reality before
the decision maker, because of assumption, agreement, or prior determination,
evaluating the "seriousness of the violations" does not involve questions of fact.
The decision maker simply compares the circumstances determined to constitute
the "violations" against the decision maker's background notions of
"seriousness." No inductive inferences about the circumstances are required, so
this is a question of law.
In contrast, determining "the economic benefits accrued from the violations,"
"prior violations," and "good-faith efforts to comply with the relevant
requirements" clearly requires inductive inferences about the nature of the
violator's conduct and mental state, matters essential to the transactions or
occurrences in dispute. These are fact questions that should be answered by the
jury. 268 Of course, to the extent that, in a particular case, a jury identifies or the
parties agree on the economic benefits, the prior violations, and the good-faith
efforts to comply, a judge could weigh those factors against the seriousness of the
offense without the need for further inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute. The mere weighing of those factors is an application of
normative considerations of justice-a matter of law. The judge could perform
that function without abridging the right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment.
Evaluating the economic impact of the penalty on the violator involves
inductive inferences, but not about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.
Instead of determining what effects will or would have flowed from the conduct
of the parties, the decision maker must make a probabilistic judgment about the
consequences that are likely to follow from the decision maker's own actions in
imposing a remedy. Although that decision concerns one of the parties, it involves
the outcome of the litigation rather than the events or conditions that underlie the
plaintiff's claim. It is, therefore, a question of law that the judge may decide.
The fact that the assessment of a civil penalty includes significant legal
aspects makes the Court's decision in Tull seem acceptable. The Court may even
have intuited the importance of the legal questions as a basis for assigning the
decision to the judge. Arguably, whether the jury or the judge should assess the
penalties could be decided on a case-by-case basis depending on which factors
predominate. But questions about the economic benefits of the conduct and the
268 With respect to "prior violations," they involve the transactions or occurrences in
dispute if they relate to the circumstances for which liability has been assessed. To the extent
they involve different properties, different conduct, and significantly different time frames, they
may be so removed as not to involve the transactions or occurrences in dispute. In that case,
determining the prior violations would not constitute a question of fact.
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good-faith efforts to comply with the regulations lie too close to the heart of the
dispute to be usurped by the judge in any case in which they are seriously
contested. These are questions of fact, and a civil litigant with a right to a jury trial
who puts data addressing them before the factfinder has a right to jury decision
under the Seventh Amendment.
Feltner, which involved the assessment of statutory damages under
Copyright Act, reprises the issues raised in Tull and in some respects repudiates
Tull. The Court relied primarily on the historical test to find that the Seventh
Amendment required a jury decision on the amount of statutory damages, both
because of the traditional preference for jury determinations of damages and
because of the fact that juries determined damages under the original Copyright
Act of 1831.
The Court's decision in Feltner is unfortunate in that it confuses the question
of whether some right to a jury applies with the question of whether the jury
should decide a particular question. Under established precedent, for better or
worse, the former turns on the law-equity distinction, analyzed through the
historical test. The Court properly invoked that test to decide that a jury right
applies in a copyright damages case. Following in the footsteps of Markman,
however, the Court then extended the historical analysis to the analytically
distinct question of whether a jury should decide on the amount of statutory
damages. The Court never discussed the actual question posed and answered in
the district court. Its analysis focused on "statutory damages" in the abstract,
without ever considering the inferences required to determine damages under the
specific statutory command at issue.
The statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act contains two sections.
The first section offers the copyright owner the option of electing, instead of
actual damages and profits, damages of from $500 to $20,000 "for all
infringements involved in the action, with respect to any one work... as the court
considers just. '269 Courts have consistently interpreted that provision to allow for
an award of from $500 to $20,000 for each act of infringement. The second
section allows for adjustments to the amounts awarded under the first section.
Where the copyright owner shows that the violations were "committed willfully,"
the award for each infringement may be increased to a sum of not more than
$100,000. Where the infringer shows that he or she "was not aware and had no
reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement," the award for
each infringement may be reduced to a sum of not less than $200.270
Assuming that there is a body of data about the circumstances of the
infringement on which the parties have agreed or assumed or that have already
been determined, applying Section 1 of the Act requires no inductive inferences
about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. A decision maker applying
269 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2000).
270 See id. § 504(c)(2).
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Section 1 must answer two questions: "How many acts of infringement were
there?" and "What constitutes a 'just' award for each act of infringement?" To
answer the first question, the decision maker simply considers the circumstances
of the infringement and decides how to segregate them into discrete acts. No
further inductive inferences about what happened are required. To answer the
second question, the decision maker refers to his or her normative conceptions of
justice, considering factors such as "the circumstances of the infringement,....
and the efficacy of the damages as a deterrent to future copyright
infringement."'271 Again, no further inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute are required.272
Applying Section 2 of the Act, however, does require inductive inferences
about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. Here the decision maker must
determine whether the infringement was willful, or, the converse, whether the
infringer was not aware of the infringement. These questions require an inference
about the mental state of the infringer. Inferences about the mental state of the
parties are inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute.
They are "factual" in my sense, and so must go to the jury under the Seventh
Amendment.
In Feltner, Columbia put in evidence of willfulness, and the court found that
Feltner had acted willfully.273 The Supreme Court could have seized on that
component of the decision as a basis for finding that the determination of
statutory damages was a fact question for the jury. Instead, the Court embarked
on a historical analysis that, while providing a relatively determinate answer in
this case, has shown limited utility in many others.274 Moreover, the Court's
analysis suggests that any question respecting the amount of statutory damages
under the Copyright Act must go to the jury. In fact, only the inquiry into the
defendant's state of mind constitutes a question of fact for which a jury decision is
required. A court could give that question to the jury on a special verdict and then
decide the amount of damages to be awarded based on the jury's findings. A
decision on the amount of damages under that scenario would not involve any
271 Video Views, Inc. v. Studio 21, Ltd., 925 F.2d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1991) (quoting
F.E.L. Publ'ns Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 754 F. 2d 216, 219 (7th Cir. 1985)).
272 The question of deterrence might be considered factual if it involved specific
deterrence between the parties. That is, if there were a concern that this defendant might
continue to infringe on this plaintiff's intellectual property, the deterrence question would
involve inductive inferences about the future conduct of the parties to the dispute. But to the
extent the deterrence question focuses on potential infringers in general, or even on this
defendant with respect to its likelihood of infringing on others in the future, the question does
not entail inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute, and so is not
factual.
273 Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 344 (1998).
274 See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (describing "abstruse historical
inquiry" as "difficult to apply").
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additional inductive inferences about the transactions or occurrences in dispute. It
would involve only normative considerations of justice and deterrence. Although
a court could choose to give that question to the jury, failing to do so would not
abridge the right to a jury under the Seventh Amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
Several points emerge from this discussion. As an initial matter, the term
"question of law" has at least three distinct senses. First, it refers to the screening
decisions a judge makes about whether the matter can proceed in a particular
forum and about the data and questions that should be put before the tribunal.
Second, it refers to decisions about the contestability of specific data or proposed
questions. When the judge concludes that a datum must be accepted as accurately
portraying external reality or that a question can be answered only one way, his
decision to that effect is designated a matter of law, even if the decision involves
factual inferences. Finally, it refers to appropriate and contestable questions for
which no jury decision is required.
The last sense is the one in which the fact-law distinction and the Seventh
Amendment intersect. Under the Seventh Amendment, questions of fact must go
to the jury; questions of law may permissibly be decided by the judge. A question
of fact is one that requires inductive inferences about the transactions or
occurrences in dispute. A question of law is one that requires either deductive
inferences or inductive inferences about matters beyond the transactions or
occurrences in dispute, such as the intentions of legislators or other judges and the
likely effect of a decision on the future conduct of other people. The Supreme
Court's recent Seventh Amendment decisions either implicitly or explicitly
employ this distinction. Courts applying the Seventh Amendment to assign
decisional responsibility should employ it explicitly.
Judicial decisions applying the fact-law distinction demonstrate courts'
intuitive ability to separate questions of law from questions of fact based on the
inferences required. They also demonstrate, however, the ease with which courts
can manipulate the jury right by adopting rules of law that call for "legal" rather
than "factual" questions. Inevitably, if the jury right is tied to the determination of
fact questions, courts can minimize the impact of the right by minimizing the fact
questions required to prevail on a particular legal theory. That is what the
Supreme Court did in Markman, the most controversial of the Court's recent
Seventh Amendment decisions. It constructed a doctrine of patent infringement
under which the determinative question does not require inductive inferences
about the events or conditions underlying the plaintiff's claims. It then properly
assigned that question to the judge.
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Markman has been criticized for usurping the jury's role in patent
litigation.275 Some of that criticism takes issue with the decision on Seventh
Amendment grounds.276 The criticism may very well be justified as a policy
matter-there may be reasons why we think juries should play a bigger role in
patent litigation than Markman seems to allow. But those sorts of policy
arguments find no support in the Seventh Amendment. The Seventh Amendment
does not compel adherence to any particular legal doctrine. It simply says that
whenever a doctrine calls for a decision on a question of fact, the decision must
go to the jury (assuming the cause of action is one to which the Seventh
Amendment applies). There will always be the potential for judges to construct
legal doctrines that skew the decisionmaking process toward the judge by
minimizing fact questions. At least in some cases, appellate courts and
legislatures can act as a check on inappropriate judicial behavior. In the end,
though, we have no choice but to rely on judges to interpret and construct legal
rules in ways that comport with precedent and that respect fundamental rights,
including the right to ajury trial.277
275 See Theresa M. Seal, Casenote, The Jury Is Out: Supreme Court Confirms
Construction of Patent Claim Falls Within Exclusive Province of the Court, 22 S. ILL. U. L.J.
785 (1998).
276 See Louis Silvestri, Note, A Statutory Solution to the Mischiefs of Markman v.
Westview Instruments, Inc., 63 BROOKLYN L. REv. 279 (1997).
2 7 7 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (arguing that
judges do and should rely on rights-based principles to reach the best possible decision, given
past legal practice).
2003] 1181

